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This Article examines permissive rules of professional con-
duct—that is, rules providing that lawyers “may” engage in 
particular conduct—and the implications of these rules for 
other law governing lawyers. One might assume that, when a 
professional code explicitly authorizes lawyers to engage in cer-
tain behavior, the drafters made a normative judgment that 
the best way to regulate the conduct covered by the rule is to 
let lawyers determine how to act as a matter of individual dis-
cretion. One might also take the view that this normative 
judgment is worthy of respect and that other lawmakers should 
not encroach on the discretion accorded by the rules. This Arti-
cle calls that view into question. It demonstrates that permis-
sive aspects of the professional codes may be more limited than 
readily apparent and that, even when the code drafters intend 
to relegate issues to lawyers’ discretion, their justifications for 
according discretion often leave room for external constraints. 
Lawyers are regulated by court-adopted disciplinary rules 
and other law, including civil liability standards,1 civil statutes 
and regulations,2 and criminal law.3 There is a robust body of 
 
 1. See generally 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY E. SMITH, LEGAL MAL-
PRACTICE pt. III (5th ed. 2005) (describing theories of liability for legal profes-
sionals). 
 2. For example, the IRS has adopted rules for federal tax practitioners, 
e.g., Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2006), the 
SEC has adopted rules for securities lawyers, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), and the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office has adopted rules for patent and trademark lawyers, e.g., Changes to 
the Representation of Others Before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 69 
Fed. Reg. 35,428 (June 24, 2004) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 10, 11). 
 3. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1998) (discussing criminal prosecutions of lawyers); 
Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Crimes: Beyond the Law?, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 73 
(2001) (same). 
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academic and professional literature on the interrelationship 
between the disciplinary rules—which typically are modeled on 
the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct4—and the other law governing lawyers.5 Exter-
nal law plainly influences the legal ethics codes; code drafters6 
routinely incorporate legal standards into the professional 
rules7 and rely upon the effects of extra-code constraints to 
supplement the codes’ effects.8 The influence of the ethics codes 
on external law, however, is less plain. 
 
 4. For the most part, this Article uses the ABA’s Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (Model Rules) and the ABA’s Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (Model Code) as illustrations of disciplinary rules. Neither the 
Model Rules nor the Model Code has legal force. However, prior to the adop-
tion of the Model Rules in 1983, most states based their disciplinary rules on 
the Model Code and, since then, the majority of states have based their disci-
plinary rules on some version of the Model Rules. The Model Rules were com-
prehensively amended in 2002, and many states have either amended their 
codes in light of the changes or have begun examining their codes with an eye 
to doing so. On one issue important to this Article—the circumstances under 
which lawyers may disclose client confidences to avert harm to third parties—
there is significant state variation. See infra note 80. 
 5. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 799 (1992) (discussing the interplay of the various forms of regulation). 
 6. By “code drafters,” this Article refers to all of the various participants 
in promulgating the professional rules. With respect to the ABA Model Code 
and ABA Model Rules, this includes the reporters, their committees, task 
forces, and advisors, and the ABA House of Delegates which adopts the rules. 
Each state employs its own set of drafters who help the state’s highest court 
determine which rules to adopt. 
 7. General principles of agency, fiduciary, criminal, and evidentiary law 
support many of the codes’ provisions. Some rules refer specifically to external 
law. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d), 1.6(b)(6), 1.16(c), 4.1, 
5.5, 8.4(b)–(c) (2006). 
 8. See Green, supra note 3, at 330 (discussing criminal prosecutions for 
conduct that also violates the ethics codes); Wolfram, supra note 3, at 75 (dis-
cussing criminal prosecutions of lawyers); Fred C. Zacharias, The Future 
Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and 
False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 867 (2002) 
(discussing the interrelationship between ethics codes and civil liability stan-
dards); Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 675, 687 (2003) (“[T]he disciplinary system relies upon criminal and 
civil remedies to provide supplemental implementation of its goals.”); Fred C. 
Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, 
and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 233 
(1993) [hereinafter Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Codes] (“[T]he codes 
rely on noncode constraints to limit and punish misconduct . . . .”); Fred C. 
Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends in Federal Regulation of Lawyers, 
PROF. LAW., 2003 Symposium Issue, at 15, 15–22 [hereinafter Zacharias, Un-
derstanding Recent Trends] (discussing federal administrative regulation of 
lawyer conduct). 
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Much of the literature on the extra-disciplinary signifi-
cance of ethics codes focuses on whether mandatory rules (i.e., 
rules that require or prohibit particular conduct) should be en-
forced outside the disciplinary context—for example, whether 
they should serve as the standard of civil liability for profes-
sional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, or fraud;9 whether 
they should be used in judicial proceedings as the basis of liti-
gation sanctions10 or disqualification;11 and whether they may 
form the basis for criminal liability.12 On this issue, the ABA 
drafters themselves have taken a modest approach. For a long 
 
 9. Compare Stephen E. Kalish, How to Encourage Lawyers to Be Ethical: 
Do Not Use the Ethics Codes as a Basis for Regular Law Decisions, 13 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 649, 668–69 (2000) (arguing that ethics law and regular law 
“should be separate”), Daniel Engelman, Comment, The Rules of Professional 
Conduct and Civil Liability of Attorneys, 1993 DETROIT C. L. REV. 915, 947 
(1993) (arguing that the Rules are not too vague to define the standard of care 
and that the Rules’ standard of care is much less ambiguous than the common 
law standard of the “reasonable” lawyer), and David J. Fish, Comment, The 
Use of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct to Establish the Standard of 
Care in Attorney Malpractice Litigation: An Illogical Practice, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
65, 80 (1998) (arguing that the Rules, which were not enacted by the legisla-
ture and therefore are not statutory in nature, should not be the basis for civil 
liability), with Gary A. Munneke & Anthony E. Davis, The Standard of Care in 
Legal Malpractice: Do the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Define It?, 22 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 33, 83 (1998) (“[C]ase law outside the field of legal malpractice 
demonstrates that courts consistently cite ethical rules to support decisions 
that modify the standards of civil liability.”), and Charles W. Wolfram, The 
Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil 
Litigation, 30 S.C. L. REV. 281, 283 (1979) (arguing for enforcement of ethics 
codes in the civil liability context). 
 10. See, e.g., JUDITH A. MCMORROW & DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE FED-
ERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 809.01 (3d 
ed. 1997) (explaining that when lawyers abuse the discovery process to the 
point of unethical behavior, “courts frequently look to the principles and lan-
guage of legal ethics . . . to determine whether to use their inherent power to 
sanction the conduct at issue”). 
 11. Compare, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The 
Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 73 (1996) (“[D]isqualification should 
not be a per se remedy for a violation of a conflict rule and . . . , on the con-
trary, the court’s determination should not be based on the conflict rules at 
all.”), with Susan R. Martyn, Developing the Judicial Role in Controlling Liti-
gation Conflicts: Response to Green, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 131 passim (1996) 
(arguing that removing the threat of disqualification would provide a greater 
incentive for lawyers to bend or break the conflict of interest rules). 
 12. See Green, supra note 3, at 329–30 (discussing the application of 
criminal law to lawyer misconduct); Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 
54 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 690 (2005) (“If the ethics rules can form the basis of a 
criminal prosecution, then the next step may be the pursuit of lawyers for 
their representation of clients that, while not unethical, fails to prevent mis-
conduct.”). 
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time, their position was that the codes should play no role out-
side the disciplinary context13—a position that was at odds 
with the widespread use of the codes in a variety of extra-
disciplinary settings. Currently, the drafters acknowledge that 
ethics codes may have consequences outside the disciplinary 
context, but insist that the professional rules are not drafted 
with those consequences in mind.14 
Comparatively little attention has been given to a separate 
question about the extra-code influence of professional rules; 
namely, whether provisions that accord lawyers choices regard-
ing particular conduct should be respected by external law-
makers who might otherwise forbid or compel the conduct. 
Unlike mandatory rules—which embody either obligations tell-
ing lawyers what they “must” or “shall” do or prohibitions tell-
ing lawyers what they “may not” or “shall not” do15—permissive 
 
 13. The ABA’s 1969 Model Code stated that it does not “undertake to de-
fine standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct.” MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1969). Similarly, the pre-2002 ver-
sions of the ABA’s Model Rules claimed: 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should 
it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The 
Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a 
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They 
are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the pur-
pose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing 
parties as procedural weapons. . . . Accordingly, nothing in the Rules 
should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers 
or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (1983). 
 14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 20 (2006) (“Violation 
of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor 
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been 
breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any 
other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending 
litigation. . . . Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct 
by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the ap-
plicable standard of conduct.”). 
 15. See id. R. 1.2(a) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concern-
ing the objectives of representation . . . .”); id. R. 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not 
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows 
is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); id. R. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); id. R. 1.4(a)(3) (“A lawyer 
shall keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter . . . .”); 
id. R. 1.6(a) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representa-
tion of a client unless the client gives informed consent . . . .”); cf. id. R. 6.1 
(providing anomalously that lawyers “should aspire to render at least (50) 
hours of pro bono publico legal services per year”). 
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professional rules generally are “cast in the term ‘may.’”16 This 
means, according to the ABA drafters, that they “define ar-
eas . . . in which the lawyer has discretion to exercise profes-
sional judgment.”17 Permissive aspects of the codes include 
various exceptions to attorney-client confidentiality18 as well as 
rules permitting lawyers to refrain from offering suspected per-
jury in a civil case,19 to charge a contingent fee in most types of 
cases,20 to undertake certain conflicted representations upon 
the client’s informed consent,21 and to withdraw from the rep-
resentation under specified conditions.22 
 
 16. Id. pmbl. ¶ 14 (“Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms 
of ‘shall’ or ‘shall not.’ . . . Others, generally cast in the term ‘may,’ are permis-
sive and define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has discretion to 
exercise professional judgment. No disciplinary action should be taken when 
the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion.”). 
 17. Id. But see id. R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (noting that although Rule 1.6(b) “per-
mits but does not require disclosure of” client confidences in specified situa-
tions, “[d]isclosure may be required . . . by other Rules” in some circumstances 
if Rule 1.6(b) permits disclosure, and in one circumstance regardless of 
whether Rule 1.6(b) permits disclosure). 
 18. See id. R. 1.6(b) (setting forth exceptions to confidentiality). 
 19. See, e.g., id. R. 3.3(a)(3) (“A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other 
than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer rea-
sonably believes is false.”). 
 20. See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(i)(2) (“[T]he lawyer may . . . contract with a client 
for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.”). 
 21. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7(b) (setting forth cases involving a concurrent con-
flict of interest in which a lawyer “may” accept the representation with a cli-
ent’s informed consent). 
 22. See id. R. 1.16(b) (setting forth circumstances under which “a lawyer 
may withdraw from representing a client”). Other provisions of the Model 
Rules are also framed in permissive language. See id. R. 1.2(c) (“A lawyer may 
limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable . . . .”); id. 
R. 1.5(c) (stating that subject to limitations, “[a] fee may be contingent”); id. 
R. 1.5(e) (detailing when lawyers from different firms may divide a fee); id. 
R. 1.7(b) (“Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of inter-
est . . . a lawyer may represent a client” under specified circumstances.); id. 
R. 1.13(c) (“[I]f (1) . . . the highest authority that can act on behalf of the or-
ganization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner 
an action or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and (2) the law-
yer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information 
relating to the representation . . . .”); id. R. 1.13(g) (allowing a lawyer repre-
senting an organization also to represent its members and constituents, sub-
ject to the conflict rule); id. R. 1.14(b) (allowing a lawyer to take protective ac-
tion if his client either has diminished capacity or is at risk of imminent 
harm); id. R. 1.14(c) (authorizing a lawyer to reveal information about a client 
with diminished capacity to take protective action where reasonably necessary 
to protect the client’s interests); id. R. 1.15(b) (“A lawyer may deposit the law-
yer’s own funds in a client trust account for the sole purpose of paying bank 
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Given the model code drafters’ professed indifference to the 
disciplinary rules’ influence on other lawyer regulation, it 
would seem peculiar for the bar to ask external lawmakers to 
defer to the normative judgments underlying the codes’ permis-
sive rules. But the profession has not been inhibited by the code 
drafters’ position. Witness the ABA’s recent, and apparently 
successful, opposition to a proposed reporting requirement 
originally considered for inclusion in the Security and Ex-
change Commission’s (SEC) Sarbanes-Oxley regulations.23 The 
 
service charges . . . .”); id. R. 1.17 (detailing when a lawyer may sell a law 
practice); id. R. 2.3(a) (“A lawyer may provide an evaluation of a matter affect-
ing a client for the use of someone other than the client if the lawyer reasona-
bly believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the 
lawyer’s relationship with the client.”); id. R. 3.6(b)–(c) (enumerating what a 
lawyer may state extra-judicially); id. R. 3.7(b) (allowing a lawyer to represent 
a client when another lawyer in his firm may be called as a witness, unless 
Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 forbids it); id. R. 5.5(d) (“A lawyer admitted in another 
United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended . . . may provide 
legal services in this jurisdiction that (1) . . . are not services for which the fo-
rum requires pro hac vice admission; or (2) are services that the lawyer is au-
thorized to provide by federal law or other law of this jurisdiction.”); id. R. 6.4 
(“A lawyer may serve as a director, officer, or member of an organization in-
volved in reform of the law or its administration . . . .”); id. R. 7.2(a) (“Subject 
to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise . . . .”); id. 
R. 7.3(d) (“Notwithstanding the prohibitions [from contacting prospective cli-
ents for pecuniary gain] in paragraph (a), a lawyer may participate with a 
prepaid or group lawyer service plan . . . .”); id. R. 7.4(a) (“A lawyer may com-
municate the fact that a lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of 
law.”); id. R. 7.4(b) (“A lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice . . . may 
use the designation ‘Patent Attorney’. . . .”); id. R. 7.4(c) (“A lawyer engaged in 
Admiralty practice may use the designation ‘Admiralty’ . . . .”); id. R. 7.5(b) (“A 
law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name 
. . . .”); id. R. 7.5(d) (“Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a part-
nership or other organization only when that is the fact.”). 
 23. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attor-
neys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8150, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,673 (Dec. 2, 
2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (“Under certain circumstances, these 
[proposed] provisions permit or require attorneys to effect a so-called ‘noisy 
withdrawal’ and to notify the Commission that they have done so and permit 
attorneys to report evidence of material violations to the Commission.”); see 
also Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Se-
curities Act Release No. 33-8156, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6324–25 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 205, 240, 290). 
For discussions of the SEC regulations governing securities lawyers, and 
particularly the SEC’s consideration of a mandatory reporting rule, see Ruth-
erford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of Trans-
actional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 25–26 (2003); 
Stephen Fraidin & Laura B. Mutterperl, Advice for Lawyers: Navigating the 
New Realm of Federal Regulation of Legal Ethics, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 609, 647–
54 (2003); Thomas D. Morgan, Sarbanes-Oxley: A Complication, Not a Contri-
bution, in the Effort to Improve Corporate Lawyers’ Professional Conduct, 17 
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SEC proposal would have required lawyers to alert the SEC to 
public corporations’ wrongdoing through a “noisy with-
drawal.”24 The ABA’s response was that SEC regulation should 
not preempt disciplinary rules that, in most states, give law-
yers discretion to report client wrongdoing.25 The ABA argued 
that a mandatory disclosure rule would “remov[e] the flexibility 
that lawyers need in order to have time to counsel their corpo-
rate clients effectively” and would be “undesirable, costly and 
unnecessary.”26 Consistent with this approach, the ABA 
amended its model confidentiality rule to expand lawyers’ dis-
cretion to report client misconduct, but pointedly rejected a 
mandatory disclosure obligation in the vein of the SEC’s pro-
posal.27 
 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5–6 (2003); Samantha Ahuja, Note, What Do I Do 
Now? A Lawyer’s Duty Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1263, 1317–30 
(2004). 
 24. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attor-
neys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 71,674 (proposing that a lawyer who does not receive an 
appropriate response from a corporate client regarding an internal report of a 
securities violation be required to stop representing the company, notify the 
SEC of his withdrawal, and “disaffirm” any securities filings that are 
“tainted”); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct 
Rules Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan. 23, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2003-13.htm (noting deferral of the proposal); see also Roger C. Cramton 
et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. 
REV. 725, 809–16 (2004) (discussing the proposal). 
 25. See Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to the 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s74502/apcarlton1.htm [hereinafter Letter from ABA to SEC]. At the 
time of its response to the SEC’s request for comments, the ABA itself had re-
cently rejected proposed confidentiality exceptions that would give lawyers 
discretion in limited circumstances to report clients’ financial wrongdoing, but 
the proposed exceptions were reconsidered and adopted soon after. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2006); Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force 
on Corporate Responsibility, Preliminary Report of the American Bar Associa-
tion Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 58 BUS. LAW. 189, 205–07 (2002). 
 26. Letter from ABA to SEC, supra note 25; see also E. Norman Veasey, 
The Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation 
in Responding to Fraudulent Conduct by Corporate Officers or Agents, 70 
TENN. L. REV. 1, 21 (2002) (“To the extent that the lawyer’s leverage to remon-
strate effectively with the client to prevent or rectify fraud is an important 
goal—and I think it is—that goal is clearly better achieved if the lawyer has 
discretion to disclose or not to disclose, depending on the circumstances.”). See 
generally Christin M. Stephens, Comment, Sarbanes-Oxley and Regulation of 
Lawyers’ Conduct: Pushing the Boundaries of the Duty of Confidentiality, 24 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 271, 281–86 (2005) (discussing the SEC proposal 
and the ABA response). 
 27. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2006) (allow-
ing lawyers to disclose information to prevent clients from committing crimes 
or frauds in furtherance of which the lawyers’ services have been used, or to 
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In general, when the bar asks lawmakers to defer to per-
missive rules (such as the attorney-client confidentiality excep-
tions), the bar’s argument is that the rules reflect a considered 
judgment that it is important to allow lawyers to decide for 
themselves how to act, rather than mandating lawyers’ con-
duct—either through ethics codes or other law.28 That judg-
ment may rest on a variety of rationales, including the premise 
that lawyers making individualized decisions are in the best 
position to judge how to proceed, the notion that lawyers’ 
autonomy is worthy of respect, or the argument that there sim-
ply is no best choice among the alternative courses of conduct. 
The code drafters’ judgment in favor of discretion arguably de-
serves respect because the drafters have special expertise in 
understanding the true work of, and competing pulls upon, 
lawyers.29 Insofar as a state’s highest court has adopted the 
ABA model as part of the local professional rules, so that a 
permissive rule might be said to reflect a considered decision 
by the bench as well as the bar, the argument that external 
lawmakers should defer and respect lawyers’ discretion has 
greater force.30 
The validity of this kind of argument depends upon 
whether it is accurate to characterize a particular permissive 
provision as embodying a normative judgment favoring discre-
tion not only for purposes of professional discipline but also for 
purposes of regulation more generally. Each permissive rule 
implicitly raises two questions. First, does a rule telling law-
 
mitigate injuries resulting from such crimes or frauds); id. R. 1.13(c) (allowing 
lawyers to reveal information under limited circumstances when necessary to 
prevent injury to an organizational client).  
 28. As discussed in Parts IV.A–C, however, the permissive nature of a 
rule does not always signal an intent of the drafters to defer entirely to lawyer 
discretion. Nor does the fact that the codes believe a rule granting discretion is 
appropriate necessarily mean that other law-making institutions (e.g., courts) 
will agree or that the code drafters expect them to agree.  
 29. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 9 (2006) (noting the 
“conflicting responsibilities” that lawyers encounter); Richard E. Flamm, Look-
ing Ahead to Ethics 2015: Or Why I Still Do Not Get the ABA Model Conflict of 
Interest Rules, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 273, 274 (1999) (“No one can honestly 
quarrel, furthermore, with either the Commission Members’ credentials, or 
the diligence with which they have tackled their duties . . . .”).  
 30. Cf. Green, supra note 3, at 387 (“Where professional norms are clear, 
they are presumptively worthy of respect. . . . If one accepts that the profes-
sional norms, particularly as embodied in the lawyer codes, are a reasonable 
articulation of the elements of effective legal assistance, then criminal prose-
cutions that are in tension with professional norms should be a cause for con-
cern.”). 
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yers they “may” do something really mean it? In other words, is 
lawyer discretion meant to be as broad as it appears on the face 
of the rule? Second, did the ABA (or state) code drafters in fact 
make a normative judgment about what lawyers may or may 
not do, to which they intended other lawmakers, in other con-
texts, to defer? Permissive rules conceivably reflect various 
purposes and understandings, so the answers to these two 
questions may differ from provision to provision. 
The questions concerning the interpretation of the codes’ 
permissive rules have broad implications for lawyer regulation. 
State31 and federal statutes,32 civil procedure rules,33 and ad-
ministrative regulations34 all restrict lawyers from engaging in 
aspects of conduct that permissive ethics rules appear to au-
thorize—for example, restricting lawyers’ discretion regarding 
whether to disclose or maintain confidences,35 to accept a 
 
 31. For example, some state child abuse reporting statutes require law-
yers to report threatened harm, when confidentiality rules typically leave the 
reporting decision to the lawyers’ discretion. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 
(Supp. 2006) (“Any attorney . . . having reasonable cause to suspect that a 
child is . . . an abused child, shall cause an oral report to be made immedi-
ately . . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.005 (2003) (including “attorney” as a 
“[p]ublic or private official” who has a duty to report child abuse under section 
419B.010).  
 32. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2000) (stating that a lawyer who “hold[s] 
or represent[s] an interest adverse to the estate” should not represent the es-
tate), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2006) (allowing a 
client to waive his lawyer’s conflict of interest). 
 33. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (requiring a lawyer serving as class 
counsel to “adequately represent the interests of the class”), with MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2006) (providing opportunities to waive 
conflicts of interest). 
 34. For example, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) brought charges 
against the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler for allegedly 
assisting its clients in submitting misleading information in violation of 12 
C.F.R. § 563.180(b)(1) (1989) (current version at 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(b)(1) 
(2006)). See Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, 
Scholer, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 985, 988–91 (1993). The agency interpreted its regulations to for-
bid financial institutions’ lawyers from submitting information that they be-
lieved, but did not know, to be false. See id. at 991. Such conduct would ordi-
narily be permissible under the Model Rules, at least in the context of 
advocacy. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3), 3.9 (2006). See 
generally Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends, supra note 8, at 16–18 
(discussing administrative regulations imposed by other federal agencies that 
followed the OTS model). 
 35. See SEC Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing 
and Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of the Issuer, 17 
C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1)–(3) (2006) (requiring a lawyer to report fraud to the chief 
legal officer and the chief executive officer, or to the board of directors if the 
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waiver of a conflict,36 or to charge a contingent fee.37 Lawyers 
also are potentially subject to civil liability under common law 
standards for acting within the range of discretion afforded by 
a permissive rule.38 Whether legislatures, administrative agen-
cies, and courts should give weight—perhaps even preemptive 
weight—to an ethics rule that authorizes lawyers to exercise 
discretion depends, at least initially, on the meaning of the rule 
and what it is intended to accomplish. 
To date, little attention has been paid to the nature of 
permissive ethics rules.39 This Article examines some of the ex-
isting examples of permissive rules and identifies the range of 
premises that appear to underlie them. It demonstrates that 
the extent of discretion accorded by the codes, even for discipli-
nary purposes, is narrower and less certain than initially ap-
pears. Moreover, the Article suggests that, given the current 
state of professional regulation, one can rarely argue defini-
 
officers do not respond in a reasonable time); Patent and Trademark Office 
Code of Professional Responsibility, 37 C.F.R. § 10.85(b)(1) (2006) (“A practi-
tioner who receives information clearly establishing that . . . [a] client has, in 
the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal 
shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and if the client refuses 
or is unable to do so the practitioner shall reveal the fraud to the affected per-
son or tribunal.”).  
 36. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). 
 37. See Board of Veterans’ Appeals: Rules of Practice, 38 C.F.R. 
§ 20.609(d)(2)(i) (2006) (prohibiting a lawyer to charge a contingent fee when a 
“disinterested third party” is funding the litigation on the claimant’s or appel-
lant’s behalf ); see also Assistance Program Under the 9/11 Heroes Stamp Act 
of 2001, 70 Fed. Reg. 43,214, 43,215 (July 26, 2005) (to be codified at 44 C.F.R. 
pt. 153) (“[A]ny fee arrangement (including contingency, hourly, etc.) exceed-
ing 5% of an eligible claimant’s payment from the Heroes Stamp Act fund 
would not be in the best interest of the eligible claimant.”); Lester Brickman, 
The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price Competi-
tive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 92 n.105 (2003) (listing statutes and court rules 
that limit the amount of contingent fees). 
 38. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, It Takes More Than Cheek to Lose Our Way, 
77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 277, 284 (2003) (noting that when the ABA amended 
Rule 1.6, it increased lawyers’ risk of civil liability for failing to report client 
misconduct because they “no longer have the shield of 1.6’s prohibition on dis-
closure of confidential information”). 
 39. But see Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical 
Deliberation as Ethical Obligation, 37 IND. L. REV. 21, 46 (2003); Fred C. 
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 52 (2005) (arguing that permissive rules are not necessarily 
meant to give lawyers unbridled discretion, but may “presuppose that lawyers 
will exercise professional conscience in deciding how to act in individual cases 
within the category identified by the rule”); George W. Overton, Permissive 
Duties, CBA REC., June–July 1997, at 46, 50. 
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tively that a permissive rule reflects a normative judgment 
that is meant to be respected by other lawmakers. This conclu-
sion has importance not only for how lawmakers should view 
permissive professional rules, but also for how rule drafters 
should develop such rules in the future.40 
Part I of this Article identifies three different ways of char-
acterizing permissive rules, each of which has significance for 
determining the extent of lawyers’ discretion under the rules. 
Part II describes potential limits on lawyers’ discretion, some 
arising from the professional codes themselves and some im-
posed by outside regulation. Part III discusses the possible jus-
tifications for permissive rules, each of which seems to underlie 
at least some of the codes’ permissive provisions. Finally, Part 
IV analyzes the significance of the existence of these multiple 
characterizations and justifications for institutions writing, im-
plementing, and enforcing the rules. 
I.  THE NATURE OF DISCRETION IN PERMISSIVE  
ETHICS RULES   
Permissive ethics rules take various forms. Some give law-
yers two alternatives, or a range of alternatives, without even 
implicitly suggesting grounds for choosing between or among 
them. For example, in most jurisdictions, a lawyer who rea-
sonably believes (but does not know) that a client in a civil case 
will testify falsely “may” refuse to offer the testimony.41 In ren-
dering legal advice to clients, a lawyer “may refer not only to 
law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social 
and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situa-
tion.”42 “[A] lawyer representing an indigent client may pay 
court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.”43 
And a lawyer may “contract with a client for a reasonable con-
tingent fee in a civil case.”44 On their face, rules such as these 
have no limiting principles. 
 
 40. Part IV of this Article notes some implications of our analysis of per-
missive rules for courts and other lawmakers. However, this Article focuses 
primarily on identifying the nature of permissive rules—an important en-
deavor that the previous literature has omitted. This Article leaves the norma-
tive issues of precisely how other lawmakers should respond to permissive 
rules to another day. 
 41. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2006). 
 42. Id. R. 2.1. 
 43. Id. R. 1.8(e)(2). 
 44. Id. R. 1.8(i)(2). 
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Other permissive rules cabin lawyers’ discretion. For ex-
ample, lawyers may disclose client confidences in order to pre-
vent certain harms45 or defend themselves against accusations 
of wrongdoing,46 but only to the extent they “reasonably be-
lieve[] necessary” to accomplish the authorized end.47 A lawyer 
may accept a client’s informed waiver of concurrent conflicts of 
interests, but only under specified circumstances48 and when 
“the lawyer reasonably believes that [he or she] will be able to 
provide competent and diligent representation.”49 A lawyer 
“may limit the scope of the representation” with client con-
sent,50 but some codes circumscribe that authority to apply only 
in situations in which its exercise is “reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.”51 Lawyers “may withdraw from representing a 
client” in a series of prescribed instances,52 but must seek per-
mission of a tribunal to do so in litigation53 and take steps to 
protect the client’s interests.54 Although provisions such as 
these limit when and, in some cases, how the lawyer may exer-
cise discretion, a lawyer acting within the limitations neverthe-
less is given a range of choice.55 
 
 45. See id. R. 1.6(b)(2). 
 46. See id. R. 1.6(b)(5). 
 47. Id. R. 1.6(b); see McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1242–43 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (concluding that the future crime exception to attorney-client confi-
dentiality includes a requirement that the disclosing attorney’s belief be rea-
sonable). 
 48. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2006). 
 49. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1). 
 50. Id. R. 1.2(c). 
 51. Id. cmt. 7. 
 52. Id. R. 1.16(b). 
 53. See id. R. 1.6(c). 
 54. See id. R. 1.6(d). 
 55. A third set of discretionary rules seems to grant discretion implicitly, 
by allocating authority to lawyers to make a category of decisions without 
specifying the limits on that authority. For example, although the codes typi-
cally require lawyers to abide by client decisions concerning the “objectives of 
representation,” they also imply that lawyers have discretion to determine the 
means to implement the client’s objectives. See id. R. 1.2(a) & cmts. 1–2. The 
pre-2002 version of the Model Rules seems to grant lawyers full authority to 
make strategic decisions in pursuing clients’ objectives, but the current ver-
sion is more ambiguous. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 
cmt. 1 (2001) (assigning “responsibility for legal and tactical issues” to the law-
yer), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2006) (noting that 
clients “normally defer” to lawyers regarding tactical decisions, but concluding 
that “[b]ecause of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and 
client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the 
interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such 
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In either case, a key threshold question is how, as a gen-
eral matter, permissive rules should be viewed. There are three 
basic possibilities. A rule stating that a lawyer may, but implic-
itly need not, act in a particular way can be seen as equivalent 
to not regulating at all. It may be seen as affirmatively author-
izing a lawyer to make any decision within the range of choice 
defined by the rule. Finally, it may be seen as authorizing a 
lawyer to make choices, but only on terms, or based on consid-
erations, implied by the rule. The resolution of this threshold 
question should influence whether and how other lawmakers 
take account of a permissive rule. 
A. PERMISSIVE RULES AS NONREGULATION 
Consider the first possibility. It is not self-evident that 
permissive rules reflect anything other than a drafting alterna-
tive to nonregulation. Arguably, permissive rules simply indi-
cate where mandatory rules end and the absence of regulation 
begins. They describe an area of conduct where the professional 
rules are silent. 
For example, the rule on attorneys’ fees states that a law-
yer “may” share fees with another lawyer if certain conditions 
are fulfilled.56 Is this different from a mandatory rule stating 
that a lawyer “may not” share fees unless the same conditions 
are fulfilled? With respect to the latter rule, it would be an ex-
aggeration to conclude that the drafters affirmatively left fee 
sharing to lawyers’ “discretion” in all cases in which the condi-
tions are satisfied. The more logical interpretation is that the 
drafters took no position on (or did not regulate) fee sharing 
that occurs when the preconditions are satisfied.57 At least 
 
disagreements are to be resolved”). This Article will not address this category 
of discretionary rules as there is some dispute about whether these rules are, 
in fact, permissive; arguably, the rules are better viewed as nonregulation 
rather than permissive regulation. 
 56. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2006). 
 57. The difference between not regulating and authorizing a choice of con-
duct is highlighted by the rule requiring a lawyer to expedite litigation pro-
vided that doing so is “consistent with the interests of the client.” Id. R. 3.2. 
This rule does not appear to regulate what lawyers must or may do when ex-
pediting litigation is not consistent with the client’s interests. See id. Even so, 
it would be surprising to find courts or ethics committees interpreting the rule 
as if it affirmatively accords lawyers discretion to delay whenever delay, in 
and of itself, benefits the client. Indeed, the comments to Model Rule 3.2 sug-
gest that a lawyer must consider more than the client’s desires. See id. cmt. 1 
(stating that a lawyer who fails to expedite must have “some substantial pur-
pose other than delay”). 
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some of the other permissive rules, when read in context, have 
similar effects—suggesting nothing more than an exception to a 
mandatory standard and leaving the excepted area unregu-
lated.58 The term “may” simply is used to set boundaries estab-
lishing when the rule’s mandate or prohibition applies.59 
On the surface, the argument in favor of viewing permis-
sive rules as nonregulation is belied by the fact that the draft-
ers had a drafting choice. That the drafters opted for a permis-
sive formulation (“may . . . if”) rather than a mandatory 
formulation (“may not . . . unless”) suggests that they intended 
to do more than simply create an exception, an unregulated 
field. However, at least where the permissive rule serves as an 
exception to multiple mandates, the permissive approach may 
be the only drafting option available to accomplish nonregula-
tion. 
Assume, for instance, that trial lawyers generally “may 
not” offer evidence they know to be false,60 but otherwise gen-
erally “must” offer any other relevant evidence that will help 
the client’s cause61 or that the client insists on presenting.62 If 
 
 58. For example, Model Rule 3.1 includes two sentences, the first stating 
that a lawyer “shall not” make frivolous assertions, and the second stating 
that a lawyer in a criminal case “may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as 
to require that every element of the case be established.” Id. R. 3.1. The obvi-
ous reading is that the second sentence is meant simply to make clear that the 
rule against asserting frivolous defenses does not preclude a criminal defense 
lawyer from ensuring that the prosecution meets its burden of proof. Nothing 
suggests that the rule is meant to give the criminal defense lawyer discretion 
to require the prosecution to prove its case. Almost certainly, that choice—
ethically and constitutionally—belongs to the client. 
 59. See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(i) (“A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary inter-
est in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation . . . except that the 
lawyer may: (1) acquire a lien . . . to secure the lawyer’s fees or expenses; and 
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.”). 
Another interesting example of this phenomenon is Model Rule 1.6, which 
provides that a lawyer “may” reveal otherwise confidential information when 
necessary “to comply with other law or a court order.” Id. R. 1.6(b)(6). Because 
the exception does not require a lawyer to comply with other law, it suggests 
that the drafters envision instances in which disobedience may be appropri-
ate—perhaps in situations in which a lawyer seeks to challenge the “other 
law.” However, the permissive language certainly is not meant to imply that 
compliance with the law is purely discretionary; it simply articulates the 
boundaries of the otherwise mandatory confidentiality rules while requiring 
the lawyer (and other lawmaker) to decide whether confidentiality or other 
law should take precedence, based on considerations not apparent in the pro-
fessional rules. 
 60. See id. R. 3.3(a)(3). 
 61. This arguably is required as a matter of competence under Model Rule 
1.1. See id. R. 1.1 & cmt. 2. The Model Code made this obligation more explicit 
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the drafters want to exclude from these opposing mandates 
evidence which a lawyer “reasonably believes” to be false, the 
obvious way to do so is by saying that the lawyer “may” (but 
need not) offer such evidence. One cannot necessarily assume 
that employing permissive language has a broader purpose 
than identifying the limits of the mandatory rules. If identify-
ing those limits is indeed the objective, then even though the 
rule says “may,” it probably does not reflect a judgment that 
other lawmakers should respect the “autonomy” recognized by 
the rule, on one hand, or that lawyers should regularly exercise 
the “discretion” accorded by the rule, on the other. 
B. PERMISSIVE RULES AS DEFERRING TO LAWYER CHOICE 
The argument that permissive rules are equivalent to non-
regulation depends on one’s attitude toward the rules. Not sur-
prisingly, given lawyers’ self-interest and the structure of some 
of the rules, many practicing lawyers take an extremely law-
yer-protective view of permissive rules. They assume that 
whenever ethics provisions permit lawyers to act in a certain 
way, the provisions are defining an area in which lawyer con-
duct is meant to be unconstrained.63 On this understanding, 
the choice of conduct belongs entirely to individual lawyers.64 A 
lawyer’s decision within the area covered by a permissive rule 
is both unregulated by the disciplinary process and intended to 
be free from other regulatory oversight. 
 
by providing that a lawyer “shall not . . . [f ]ail to seek the lawful objectives of 
his client through reasonably available means.” See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980). 
 62. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980) (requiring 
lawyers to follow their clients’ directions except as to matters “not affecting 
the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of the client”); 
cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (2006) (offering sugges-
tions but not definitively prescribing how to resolve tactical disagreements be-
tween a lawyer and client when discussion between them fails to yield a reso-
lution).  
 63. See, e.g., Zacharias & Green, supra note 39, at 46–47 (discussing the 
gloss modern practitioners place on the codes).  
 64. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RICHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND 
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 107 (2d ed. 2001) (“The Code 
also, like the Model Rules, is permissive; in no circumstances is a lawyer re-
quired to disclose . . . .”); David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest 
Proposal to Grant Immunity to Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Mis-
conduct, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1825, 1825 n.1 (2004) (assuming that discretionary 
exceptions to confidentiality do not anticipate any limits on lawyers’ exercise 
of discretion).  
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If one interprets the permissive rules, or particular per-
missive rules, as endorsing professional self-restraint as the 
preferred disciplinary approach, a key question is what exter-
nal lawmakers should make of that signal. The ABA drafters 
have claimed not to work with an eye toward how other regula-
tors will use or enforce the codes.65 That does not mean, how-
ever, that the drafters are indifferent regarding the issue of 
whether other lawmakers will respect their regulatory prefer-
ences; presumably, the drafters at least hope that other regula-
tors will give some weight to the considered judgments underly-
ing the rules.66 How far this expectation extends, however, will 
not be clear from the terms of the rules. 
C. PERMISSIVE RULES AS REGULATED DISCRETION 
The ABA drafters’ explanation that “may” signifies some-
thing more than silence suggests a third, narrower understand-
ing of the permissive rules; namely, that permissive rules give 
lawyers “discretion,” but only “discretion to exercise profes-
sional judgment.”67 This approach is consistent with standards 
governing other legal actors who are expected to make discre-
tionary decisions based on particular principles and are taken 
to task for abusing their discretion.68 The explanation of “may” 
 
 65. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 11 (2006) (“To the ex-
tent that lawyers meet the obligations of their profession, the occasion for gov-
ernment regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal 
profession’s independence from government domination.”). 
 66. See, e.g., id. ¶ 14 (“Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a 
cause of action against a lawyer. . . . The Rules are designed to provide guid-
ance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through dis-
ciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. For example, judges’ discretionary decisions typically must be princi-
pled and may be reviewable for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mar-
tinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 304 (2000) (noting that “the District Court’s [deci-
sion] was an abuse of discretion” in “violation of . . . due process”); Maureen 
Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and the Conundrum of the 
Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493, 518–22 (1997) (discussing the difficulty in 
relying on judicial discretion to issue sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 11 because of the ambiguity and lack of consistent meaning of 
the word “discretion”); George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE 
L.J. 747, 764–72 (1986) (discussing how constitutional adjudication and the 
use of legal tests involving multiple factors have increased discretion in the 
judicial decision-making process). The meaning of “discretion,” however, often 
varies depending upon the context and the actor to which it applies. See 
RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131–39 (1977) (discussing 
the various meanings of the word “discretion” and its influence on judges’ deci-
sions); George P. Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion, 47 LAW 
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in the introduction to the Model Rules suggests that one should 
interpret the permissive provisions with a view to their implicit 
limitations.69 Although the rules give lawyers choices, lawyers 
are required to exercise “professional judgment” in selecting 
among those choices.70 That is, lawyers remain subject to regu-
latory oversight, but the standard by which lawyers’ conduct is 
judged is more deferential than in other areas of conduct gov-
erned by the ethics rules. 
Under this view of permissive rules, the codes’ allocation of 
discretion often comes with an implicit mandate. Lawyers’ 
choice of conduct is not unfettered, as it might be were the 
rules simply silent regarding the type of conduct in question. 
Rather, lawyers have “discretion” akin to that of a judge or ad-
ministrative agency that is accorded broad leeway. Like these 
other decision-makers, lawyers may be criticized for abusing 
their discretion.71 Perhaps lawyers may be disciplined for fail-
ing to “exercise professional judgment” implicitly contemplated 
by particular permissive rules. Maybe lawyers merely will suf-
fer professional opprobrium for exercising discretion inade-
quately.72 But in either case, the permission to choose among 
the options comes with expectations. It is subject to regula-
tion.73 
 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 271–85 (1984) (reviewing various groups’ perception 
of the meaning of “discretion” and analyzing the degree to which discretion is 
accepted as a justification for a decision). Scholars have noted that prosecu-
tors’ discretion, though broad, is expected to be exercised with a view to “serv-
ing justice” and maintaining prosecutorial neutrality. See generally Bruce A. 
Green & Fred Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 840–
52 (2004) (discussing prosecutorial discretion and neutrality); Fred C. Zacha-
rias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do 
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 53–56 (1991) (discussing prosecutors’ obligation 
to serve justice).  
 69. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 14 (2006). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See, e.g., id. ¶ 15 (“Compliance with the rules . . . depends primarily 
upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforce-
ment by peer and public opinion, and finally, when necessary, upon enforce-
ment through disciplinary proceedings.”). 
 72. See, e.g., id. ¶ 7 (“Many of a lawyer’s responsibilities are prescribed in 
the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . . However, a lawyer is also guided by . . . 
the approbation of professional peers.”). 
 73. Of course, the failure to articulate grounds for the exercise of discre-
tion under the permissive rules undermines their force. See William H. Simon, 
Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Mis-
conduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 20 (2005) (noting ABA drafters’ persistent fail-
ure to indicate how lawyers should exercise their discretion to disclose corpo-
rate clients’ confidences to avoid future harm). 
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This interpretation makes considerable sense when one 
compares permissive ethics provisions to vague or open-
textured rules that also envision variations in how different 
lawyers will act. Both open-textured provisions (such as re-
quirements of “reasonable diligence”74 and reasonable commu-
nications with the client75 and prohibitions against “unreason-
able fee[s]”76) and permissive provisions incorporate 
“standards” rather than bright-line “rules.”77 Like permissive 
provisions, open-textured provisions accord lawyers a degree of 
discretion. But the open-textured provisions envision the exer-
cise of discretion only within the narrow boundaries of other-
wise acceptable behavior. Implicitly, they signal enforcement 
authorities to refrain from proceeding against lawyers who 
make good-faith and plausible but, in hindsight, erroneous 
judgments in areas of uncertainty. In contrast, permissive pro-
visions imply a broader degree of discretion. They anticipate 
that lawyers will exercise professional judgment in the whole 
range of cases, not just close cases, and that lawyers will not be 
sanctioned for making wrong choices except perhaps in extreme 
situations in which they have failed to exercise judgment at all. 
Understood in this way, permissive ethics rules clearly dif-
fer from nonregulation (i.e., silence). They, in fact, are a form of 
regulation that has traditional roots. Until the mid-twentieth 
century, the professional codes relied less on codified rules than 
on the expectation of individual lawyers’ self-restraint, guided 
by professional norms.78 The contemporary codes for the most 
 
 74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2006). 
 75. See id. R. 1.4. 
 76. Id. R. 1.5. 
 77. Cf. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MO-
RALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 30 (2001) (“The quality that iden-
tifies a rule and distinguishes it from a standard is the quality of determi-
nateness.”); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 26–41, 120–32 (1961) 
(distinguishing rules and standards); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE 
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN 
LAW AND IN LIFE 1–16 (1991) (providing examples and explanations of various 
types of rules); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 
42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559 (1992) (offering “an economic analysis of the extent to 
which legal commands should be promulgated as rules or standards”). 
 78. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Inter-
ests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1314–16 (1995). Some modern commenta-
tors have argued that lawyer regulation has become overly legalistic and 
should rely more heavily on lawyers’ exercise of professional judgment. See, 
e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 15 (1998) (contrasting a 
“rule-focused approach” with a more contextual approach allowing the exercise 
of professional judgment). 
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part have rejected the regime of self-regulation, but one can 
view the remaining permissive rules as endorsing informed 
self-regulation with respect to limited areas of conduct. This 
understanding of the permissive rules raises obvious interpre-
tive difficulties, because the codes do not make explicit the cri-
teria on which professional judgment is to be exercised. Yet the 
emphasis on self-restraint is theoretically defensible as a mode 
of professional regulation. 
Many commentators accept the position that at least some 
permissive rules are regulatory in nature—that they require 
lawyers to make an informed choice in individual cases about 
the conduct that they are to take.79 In their view, for example, 
lawyers deciding whether to disclose client wrongdoing as per-
mitted under a “future harm” exception to the confidentiality 
rule80 must take into account both clients’ interests in confiden-
 
 79. See Levine, supra note 39, at 46 (arguing that lawyers must at least 
exercise their discretion); Zacharias & Green, supra note 39, at 53–55 (same). 
This strain of reasoning is evident in the cases that evaluate whether criminal 
defense lawyers have performed so ineffectively as to violate the constitutional 
standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669–700 (1984). 
For example, in Rompilla v. Beard, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a law-
yer’s failure to investigate. See 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2462–63 (2005). The Court 
hinted that such a failure, by itself, might not have constituted ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. See id. at 2463 (noting that there was “room for debate” on 
the issue). The Court, however, held that the lawyer’s failure to examine a file 
from a previous conviction that the prosecution had turned over and on which 
counsel had notice the prosecution intended to rely was unreasonable. See id. 
at 2467. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence noted that the lawyer’s failure to 
make a choice rendered the behavior improper because it constituted “‘inatten-
tion, not reasoned strategic judgment.’” Id. at 2471 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)). 
 80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006). There is a 
wide variation among jurisdictions’ rules authorizing lawyers to disclose client 
confidences to prevent harm to third parties. States such as New York have 
provisions based on the ABA Model Code providing that, despite the general 
obligation to preserve client confidences, a lawyer “may reveal . . . [t]he inten-
tion of a client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the 
crime.” N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (2003) (emphasis 
added). Others emulate the pre-2002 version of the Model Rules, allowing dis-
closures only to prevent criminal acts a lawyer believes are “likely to result in 
death . . . or substantial bodily harm.” CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-
100(B) (2004). Yet other states require disclosures to avert certain harms. See, 
e.g., WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006) (“A lawyer shall reveal 
[client confidences] to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to 
prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the law-
yer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm 
or in substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another.”). Some 
states authorize lawyers to disclose client confidences to prevent criminal 
fraud that is likely to result in financial harm to another, regardless of 
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tiality and third-party interests.81 At least in extreme cases, a 
lawyer abuses his professional discretion when he makes a de-
cision arbitrarily82 or based on irrelevant or impermissible con-
siderations.83 It would thus be improper for a lawyer to treat 
the future harm exception as a default rule and to bargain at 
the outset of the representation never to reveal client wrongdo-
ing, or to decide categorically never to disclose client wrongdo-
ing as permitted by the rule, because doing so would derogate 
third-party interests that the rule protects.84 
However, even accepting the baseline assumption that 
some permissive rules contain limits on the exercise of discre-
tion, the extent of those limits typically is unclear. For exam-
 
whether the lawyer’s services were used in the fraud. See, e.g., N.J. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006) (“A lawyer shall reveal” client confidences 
to prevent the client or another “from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudu-
lent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in . . . substan-
tial injury to the financial interest or property of another.”).  
 81. See Levine, supra note 39, at 47–52 (describing a deliberative model of 
exercising discretion); Zacharias & Green, supra note 39, at 53–54 (discussing 
potentially mandatory aspects of exercising discretion under the permissive 
exceptions to confidentiality); Limor Zer-Gutman, Revising the Ethical Rules 
of Attorney Client Confidentiality: Towards a New Discretionary Rule, 45 LOY. 
L. REV. 669, 705–06 (1999) (suggesting that a discretionary rule is not a volun-
tary rule, but a “compulsory and sanctionary rule” that is violated when the 
lawyer does not apply the rule in good faith or with minimal competence); cf. 
Mario J. Madden, The Indiscreet Role of Lawyer Discretion in Confidentiality 
Rules, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 603, 604–05 (2001) (criticizing the amount of 
discretion a lawyer is afforded under confidentiality exceptions, partly because 
moral judgments made under the exceptions are not “systematically legiti-
mate”). 
 82. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional 
Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 51–52 (1997) (“While a lawyer 
could decide whether or not to represent a particular client by flipping a coin, 
it would be improper for [a lawyer] to decide in an equally arbitrary manner 
whether to betray [a child client’s] confidences” to protect the child from life-
threatening harm.). 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 52, 54 (arguing that it would be impermissible to decide 
whether to disclose a child client’s confidences to protect the child from harm 
“on the basis of the lawyer’s self-interest, for example, in order to avoid the 
public criticism that might attend one decision or the other if the facts became 
known,” but that it would be permissible for a lawyer to act in her self-interest 
in deciding whether to reveal client confidences in the lawyer’s self-defense 
under current Model Rule 1.6(b)(5), because discretion is afforded for the law-
yer’s benefit). 
 84. The California Rules of Professional Conduct seem to take the oppo-
site position: under the strict language of the new California confidentiality 
provision and its comments, neither disclosure nor non-disclosure under the 
future crime exception should ever subject a lawyer to discipline. See CAL. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 & cmts. 4–5, 9 (2004). The terms of the 
rule thus suggest to lawyers that they may bargain away their options. 
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ple, whether it would be wrong for a lawyer to establish a flat 
policy that he will always disclose client wrongdoing when the 
rule affords discretion to do so is a harder question than 
whether he may always refuse to disclose.85 Announcing a prac-
tice of reporting misconduct at the outset of representation 
educates the client. If it is exclusively the client’s interest that 
will be impaired by the revelation of confidences, the lawyer 
arguably should inform the client ex ante of the circumstances 
under which the lawyer will disclose. On the other hand, if a 
permissive disclosure exception is intended to further the pub-
lic interest in law compliance by allowing lawyers to learn of 
and then discourage proposed wrongdoing by clients, it is less 
clear that a lawyer should be allowed to adopt an across-the-
board position foreclosing the exercise of discretion in either di-
rection. 
Consider another example that highlights the difficulty of 
identifying when limits on discretion apply. Most states have 
permissive conflict-of-interest provisions which provide that a 
lawyer may accept a waiver when certain conditions are satis-
fied. May a lawyer legitimately adopt an across-the-board prac-
tice of accepting all cases in which a client agrees to waive a 
conflict? Arguably, a lawyer who might become a prospective 
witness and can satisfy a lawyer-as-witness provision86 still has 
an obligation to decline representation when the client can eas-
ily retain an equally good lawyer who will not be prone to a 
disqualification motion. A lawyer confronted by an unsophisti-
cated client who is willing to waive a significant conflict under 
the governing conflict-of-interest rule87 simply to avoid having 
to seek another lawyer might also, in some circumstances, need 
to send the client elsewhere.88 Nevertheless, the contrary posi-
tion is plausible—that the conflict rules, like rules governing 
fees and initial retainer agreements, contemplate arms-length 
 
 85. For an argument supporting the latter position, see Richard W. 
Painter, Rules Lawyers Play by, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 666–67 (2001). 
 86. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2006) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from acting as both advocate and witness in the same proceeding, sub-
ject to three exceptions). 
 87. E.g., id. R. 1.7. 
 88. See Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 
407, 433 (1998) (discussing lawyers’ obligations under the conflict-of-interest 
rules). 
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transactions between lawyers and clients and therefore allow 
lawyers to exercise discretion entirely in their own interests.89 
Withdrawal rules provide another example of the interpre-
tive difficulties inherent in permissive ethics provisions. One 
might argue that when the stated grounds for permissive with-
drawal are satisfied, a lawyer may withdraw (subject to court 
approval) for any reason at all.90 An alternative view, however, 
is that a permissive withdrawal rule must be read in light of a 
lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client, so that withdrawal to 
achieve certain ends is an abuse of the lawyer’s discretion to 
withdraw.91 Cases holding that a lawyer may not drop a client 
like a “hot potato” to accept another engagement, because doing 
so is an act of disloyalty, illustrate this approach.92 In the end, 
the extent of discretion accorded by each particular rule de-
pends upon one’s interpretation of the rule’s purpose and effect. 
D. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREE CONCEPTIONS OF PERMISSIVE 
RULES 
The recognition that some permissive rules may be regula-
tory in nature—designed to identify areas in which lawyers’ 
choices must be the product of professional judgment, and not 
be made arbitrarily—has significance for external regulation. It 
means that even if judges and other lawmakers are naturally 
inclined to defer to the code drafters’ normative judgments, 
they should feel free to impose extra-code constraints when do-
ing so would reinforce an obligation to exercise professional 
 
 89. The drafters of the Model Rules encourage this interpretation by not-
ing, with respect to permissive rules, that “[n]o disciplinary action should be 
taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such 
discretion.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 14 (2006). That state-
ment is not definitive, however, because it does not define the “bounds of such 
discretion.” See id. 
 90. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 550–51 & n.83 
(1986) (arguing that where withdrawal will not harm the client, a lawyer may 
withdraw under Model Rule 1.16(b) “for no reason or for a not very appealing 
reason, such as to pursue recreational interests or . . . to make a higher fee do-
ing extensive work for a new and wealthier client,” but also noting that con-
tract law may provide a different answer). 
 91. See, e.g., Green, supra note 82, at 40–41 (arguing that it may be an 
abuse of trust for a lawyer to withdraw based on undisclosed, highly particu-
larized personal beliefs that could have been identified as potentially relevant 
prior to accepting the representation). 
 92. E.g., Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D. 
Ohio 1987) (“A firm may not drop a client like a hot potato, especially if it is in 
order to keep happy a far more lucrative client.”). 
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judgment that is implicitly contained in a professional rule. Do-
ing so would merely complement the codes. It would provide 
clearer guidance to lawyers than they receive from the permis-
sive rules and would subject lawyers who abuse their discretion 
to enforcement mechanisms that supplement, but are not in-
consistent with, professional discipline. Thus, for example, a 
decision by courts to impose civil liability for fraud when a law-
yer’s failure to report client misconduct was, in hindsight, an 
abuse of the discretion accorded by an ethics code’s confidenti-
ality exception would arguably comport with the code drafters’ 
expectations.93 
Similarly, to the extent that other permissive rules are 
equivalent to nonregulation (i.e., they simply fail to take a posi-
tion on a given type of conduct), those rules also should not con-
strain other lawmakers. The decision to leave conduct unregu-
lated for disciplinary purposes is not evidence that the drafters 
believe lawyers should never be regulated, nor does it necessar-
ily reflect the drafters’ view of the alternative lawmakers’ rela-
tive competence to establish standards of behavior. The codes’ 
failure to regulate simply means that the drafters themselves 
were unprepared, or could not agree, to dictate a single course 
of conduct. This failure does not reveal their position on 
whether other lawmakers should do so. The drafters may even 
have affirmatively desired that other lawmakers set the stan-
dards and may have contemplated that any external legal 
standards would be enforceable through professional discipline, 
based on rules requiring lawyers to comply with other law. In 
short, external regulators cannot fairly draw definitive conclu-
sions from the code drafters’ failure to restrict particular con-
duct. 
The situation is different, however, when a permissive rule 
reflects an affirmative judgment by the drafters that the opti-
mal way to regulate the particular conduct is self-regulation—
letting lawyers decide for themselves how to act, as a matter of 
professional discretion. Such a rule can be interpreted in two 
 
 93. Indeed, the expectation that civil liability might be imposed in such 
cases motivated opposition to some proposals for provisions that would permit 
whistle-blowing by lawyers. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, It’s All in the Atmos-
phere, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1447, 1448–50 (1994) (“If this rule were adopted as 
an amendment to Model Rule 1.6, it would create significant liability exposure 
for counsel. . . . [T]he fact that a lawyer had the discretion to disclose confiden-
tial information, and did not, will be no defense to the claim that if the lawyer 
had disclosed confidential information some harm or other could have been 
prevented.”). 
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ways. The drafters may have preferred self-regulation for disci-
plinary purposes, but may have been indifferent on the ques-
tion of whether other law should constrain lawyer discretion. 
Alternatively, the drafters may have believed self-regulation to 
be preferable for all purposes; in other words, that individual 
lawyers not only are in a better position than the code drafters 
to decide how to act in a particular case, but also are in a better 
position to decide than lawmakers more generally. This is how 
the ABA, in its submission to the SEC, chose to understand the 
permissive provision on lawyers’ disclosure of client miscon-
duct.94 Practicing lawyers likely take this view of most permis-
sive provisions, contemplating that when they exercise discre-
tion within the limits of the rules, they should be immune from 
professional discipline, civil liability, and judicial oversight. 
It is unclear whether code drafters generally share the ex-
pectation that lawmakers will treat the judgments in the codes’ 
permissive rules as preemptive. At least at first glance, this ex-
pectation seems presumptuous. Ethics rules are initially 
drafted by bar associations, which have no law-making author-
ity. The Model Rules explicitly deny any intent to substitute for 
civil liability standards.95 In most jurisdictions, any legal force 
the codes have derives from their adoption by the highest state 
court.96 Thus, judgments made by the code drafters are subor-
dinate to judgments of the courts. Moreover, insofar as judicial 
rule-making authority is delegated by the legislature,97 even 
judicially-adopted rules are subordinate to subsequent legisla-
tive judgments. 
In some states, however, the authority underlying ethics 
 
 94. Letter from ABA to SEC, supra note 25 (“[M]andating withdrawal and 
disaffirmance removes the flexibility that lawyers need in order to have time 
to counsel their corporate clients effectively. In some instances, premature 
withdrawal and disaffirmance of documents might seriously and unfairly 
harm the issuer and its shareholders or create disruption in the market for 
issuer’s securities, when more time spent with managers or expert advisers 
might have avoided the need for the attorney to employ so extreme a meas-
ure.”). 
 95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 20 (2006) (stating that 
a violation of the Rules does not “give rise to a cause of action” or “create any 
presumption . . . that a legal duty has been breached”). 
 96. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to 
Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 
1308 nn.12–13 (2003) (observing that state judiciaries usually control state 
regulation of lawyers). 
 97. See id. at 1308 n.13 (discussing the delegated authority of federal 
courts). 
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codes is different. Courts have primary responsibility for regu-
lating the bar, and judicially-adopted professional rules there-
fore can preempt inconsistent state legislation.98 Indeed, cases 
in some jurisdictions go so far as to hold that courts have nega-
tive inherent authority, meaning that state legislatures are 
precluded from regulating the bar even interstitially.99 Hence, 
judgments by code drafters that are approved by the courts 
should, at least arguably, preempt inconsistent legislative 
judgments. 
The argument that permissive ethics codes create, or 
should be deemed to create, an immunity from constraints un-
der federal law is considerably weaker. The argument reduces 
to a claim that the ethics codes represent the thrust of state 
law, that the authority to regulate lawyers is reserved to the 
states, and that federal law therefore cannot trump state rules 
of lawyer conduct. The Washington State Bar Association re-
cently made such an argument in response to the Sarbanes-
Oxley regulations, taking the position that its lawyers are for-
bidden from making disclosures that the SEC rules authorize 
but that state confidentiality rules prohibit.100 One might simi-
 
 98. See Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawyer 
Self-Protection: Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 359, 362 
(1998) [hereinafter Wolfram, Inherent Powers] (“Quite beyond that, most state 
supreme courts also claim the exclusive power to regulate lawyers as the court 
sees fit—even if the state’s legislature has enacted legislation that on its face 
is applicable to lawyers.”); see also Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and 
Lawyer Regulation—The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LIT-
TLE ROCK L.J. 1, 4–5 (1989) [hereinafter Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer 
Regulation] (discussing the alleged inherent power of courts to regulate law-
yers). 
 99. See Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate 
the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 543–55 
(1983) (discussing the development of courts’ claims to the exclusive right to 
regulate the bar and the more recent trend toward greater legislative control); 
Amanda Irene Figgs, Shaulis v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission: The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Continues to Wield Its Exclusive Power to 
Regulate the Manner in Which an Attorney Practices Law, 14 WIDENER L.J. 
553, 553–54 (2005) (discussing a recent case in which the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court rejected legislative controls on lawyer behavior); Wolfram, Inher-
ent Powers, supra note 98, at 374 n.46 (citing “extravagant” applications of 
negative inherent authority); Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation, 
supra note 98, at 7–12 (discussing cases applying “negative inherent author-
ity”). 
 100. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Interim Formal Op. (2003), available at http:// 
www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/formalopinion.doc (“As a general 
matter and with the current lack of case law on the pre-emption issue, a 
Washington attorney cannot as a defense against a [Washington Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct] violation fairly claim to be complying in ‘good faith’ with 
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larly argue that the SEC is forbidden to require lawyers to 
make disclosures in circumstances in which such disclosures 
are discretionary under a state confidentiality rule. Although 
the state sovereignty argument is questionable as a constitu-
tional matter,101 that is not to say that federal lawmakers 
should, as a matter of policy, ignore state rules that reflect a 
clear preference for individual self-regulation. 
In the end, however, whether the drafters can reasonably 
expect other lawmakers to defer to their judgment that lawyers 
should be given discretion clearly depends upon the rationale 
for each permissive rule. While the premise of one permissive 
provision may be that self-regulation is preferable, and there-
fore that other lawmakers should follow suit, the premise of 
others may be that self-regulation is limited or appropriate only 
for disciplinary purposes. Parts II and III address these possi-
bilities. 
II.  LIMITS ON LAWYER DISCRETION   
The claim that other lawmakers should respect the discre-
tion afforded by permissive ethics rules, and therefore that they 
should refrain from making laws that encroach on lawyers’ dis-
cretion, is strongest when that discretion is unrestricted for 
disciplinary purposes. If the code drafters themselves have im-
posed limits, it becomes harder to argue that other lawmakers 
should accede to lawyer self-regulation. In at least some cases, 
the drafters appear to have restricted discretion in ways not 
necessarily evident from the face of the permissive rules. The 
restrictions may derive either from a separate rule or from 
other law or legal processes. 
 
the SEC Regulations, as that term is used in Section 205.6(c) of the Regula-
tions, if (s)he took an action that was contrary to this Formal Opinion.”); see 
also Memorandum from the Sarbanes-Oxley Subcomm. of the Wash. State Bar 
Ass’n Special Comm. for the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
to the President, President-elect, and Board of Governors, Wash. State Bar 
Ass’n (July 2003), available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ 
ethics2003/sarbanesoxleymemotoboadofgovernors.doc (explaining the draft 
Interim Formal Ethics Opinion). 
 101. See N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 9 (2006) (holding that the Sarbanes-
Oxley requirements preempt North Carolina’s state confidentiality rules); 
Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 365 (1994) 
(rejecting the argument that state ethics rules may not be preempted by fed-
eral law); see also Cramton et al., supra note 24, at 799–801 (criticizing the 
Washington bar opinion). 
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A. LIMITS IMPOSED BY OTHER ETHICS PROVISIONS 
Mandatory provisions of the codes may limit the discretion 
granted to lawyers under a permissive rule. For example, the 
fee rule provides that a “lawyer may . . . contract with a client 
for a reasonable contingent fee.”102 This seems to suggest that 
so long as the size of a proposed contingency fee is reasonable 
given the expected recovery and risk of non-recovery, lawyers 
may require a contingent fee as a condition of the representa-
tion. Courts and ethics committees, however, have interpreted 
mandatory rules, such as the requirement in Model Rule 1.5 
that a lawyer “not make an agreement for . . . an unreasonable 
fee,”103 as limiting the lawyer’s ability to insist on a contingent 
fee. The ABA ethics committee relied upon the predecessor ver-
sion of Model Rule 1.5 and opined that “[a] lawyer normally has 
an obligation to offer a prospective client an alternative fee ar-
rangement before accepting a matter on a contingent fee ba-
sis.”104 Building on this interpretation, In re Fallers held 
squarely that despite the discretionary language in the rules, 
courts may overrule a lawyer’s decision to charge a contingent 
fee.105 
Similarly, mandatory rules arguably constrain a lawyer’s 
discretion under Model Rule 2.1 to refer to non-legal considera-
tions “such as moral, economic, social and political factors” in 
rendering legal advice.106 Irma Russell has suggested that the 
permissive provision is limited by another portion of the same 
rule that states “a lawyer shall exercise independent profes-
sional judgment and render candid advice.”107 Russell main-
tains that, when references to non-legal considerations are nec-
essary elements of “candid advice,” a lawyer must include 
 
 102. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i)(2) (2006). 
 103. Id. R. 1.5(a). Of course, Model Rule 1.8 already includes a reasonable-
ness limitation, but that limitation arguably refers only to the size of the con-
tingent fee (on a forward-looking basis), not whether a contingent fee ar-
rangement in and of itself constitutes a reasonable fee under the particular 
circumstances. See id. R. 1.8(i)(2). 
 104. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1521 
(1986) (emphasis omitted). The committee built on this gloss to conclude that 
when a client has the funds to pay a fixed fee, the lawyer should offer alterna-
tive fee arrangements and allow the client to make the choice. See id. 
 105. See 889 P.2d 20, 21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). 
 106. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2006). 
 107. Irma S. Russell, Keeping the Wheels on the Wagon: Observations on 
Issues of Legal Ethics for Lawyers Representing Business Organizations, 3 
WYO. L. REV. 513, 521 (2003). 
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them.108 Larry Gantt has argued even more broadly that law-
yers’ permissive authority to counsel clients concerning non-
legal considerations is constrained by a host of other rules, in-
cluding those governing competence, confidentiality, conflicts of 
interest, and allocation of decision making.109 Gantt concludes 
that to determine whether lawyers are required to provide 
counseling under Model Rule 2.1, they must “look beyond the 
permissive language in the text.”110 
These examples raise an interpretive question. When a 
mandatory rule conflicts with a permissive rule, which trumps? 
In some cases, a code’s comments may resolve this question. 
For example, Model Rule 8.3 requires lawyers to report certain 
misconduct of other lawyers,111 and Model Rule 4.1 requires 
lawyers to disclose material “necessary to avoid assisting a 
criminal or fraudulent act by a client,”112 but both include cave-
ats for information that is protected by the confidentiality pro-
visions of Model Rule 1.6.113 Model Rule 1.6, in turn, includes 
several discretionary exceptions to confidentiality114 which 
must be read in light of the mandatory aspects of Model Rules 
8.3 and 4.1. A comment to Model Rule 1.6 indicates that when 
both the mandatory rules and the permissive confidentiality 
exceptions apply, the mandatory obligations override the law-
yer’s discretion not to disclose.115 In jurisdictions in which the 
 
 108. See id. at 521–22 (“[T]he lawyer who bites his tongue rather than 
voice the unpleasant argument against a client’s course of action fails more 
than his own conscience; he fails to fulfill the foundational duty of providing 
candid legal advice.”). It might equally be argued, however, that the manda-
tory provision requires candid advice exclusively about legal considerations, so 
that the decision whether to refer to non-legal factors is always discretionary. 
 109. See Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, More Than Lawyers: The Legal and Ethi-
cal Implications of Counseling Clients on Nonlegal Considerations, 18 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 365, 388–97 (2005); see also Green, supra note 82, at 49–50 
(giving an example of where, “in order to address the [client’s] question compe-
tently, a lawyer must identify relevant non-legal considerations”). 
 110. Gantt, supra note 109, at 419–20. 
 111. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2006). 
 112. Id. R. 4.1(b). 
 113. See id. (requiring disclosure “to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudu-
lent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6”); id. R. 8.3(c) 
(“This Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by 
Rule 1.6.”). 
 114. See id. R. 1.6(b). 
 115. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 12. Likewise, Model Rule 3.3(b), which requires a 
lawyer to disclose a person’s intent to engage in a crime or fraud during litiga-
tion, is meant to trump any provision making disclosures of client wrongdoing 
discretionary. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (“Rule 3.3 . . . requires disclosure in some 
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professional code does not include clarifying comments, institu-
tions charged with interpreting the code (e.g., courts and ethics 
committees) must determine whether the mandatory or per-
missive rule takes priority.116 
This last point highlights an important fact: limits inher-
ent in some of the codes’ permissive provisions may only be-
come apparent as the provisions are fleshed out by ethics com-
mittees or judicial opinions interpreting the rules. Constraints 
on lawyers’ ability to demand contingent fees did not appear 
likely until the ABA ethics committee issued Informal Opinion 
86-1521.117 Potential limits on the discretion to withdraw can 
only be ascertained with any degree of certainty after courts 
implement their supervisory authority over withdrawal and 
specify the factors that are germane.118 Nevertheless, in the 
end, permissive provisions that contain the substantive and 
procedural limitations described above cannot be conceptual-
ized as purely discretionary. Realistically viewed, they contain 
explicit and implicit constraints that lawyers initially may not 
perceive or understand. 
B. LIMITS IMPOSED BY OTHER LAW OR LAWMAKERS 
Some discretionary rules limit their grants of discretion by 
delegating the right to constrain discretion to other lawmakers. 
For example, Model Rule 1.16, which permits lawyers to with-
draw from a representation in specified circumstances, explic-
itly provides that lawyers in litigation must first obtain the 
permission of the tribunal.119 Although a few courts have re-
garded this limitation as pro forma and have treated the law-
yer’s discretion to withdraw as absolute,120 most courts under-
 
circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this 
Rule.”). 
 116. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar, Op. 781 (2004) (opining that where a client 
has perpetrated a fraud on a tribunal, the lawyer must withdraw fraudulent 
submissions because correction of false submissions, although discretionary 
under the confidentiality rules, is mandatory under the rule requiring rectifi-
cation of frauds on the court). 
 117. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-
1521 (1986). 
 118. See infra text accompanying note 125. 
 119. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2006). 
 120. See, e.g., Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Intercounty Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 
310 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing a trial court’s refusal to allow 
withdrawal on the basis that the prerequisites for discretionary withdrawal 
under the professional rules had been triggered). 
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stand the limitation as authorizing courts to overrule the law-
yer’s exercise of discretion on the basis of independent interests 
(e.g., judicial efficiency).121 Similarly, the codes (at least for dis-
ciplinary purposes) appear to recognize that lawyers’ discretion 
to make certain disclosures122 is governed by the obligation to 
comply with other law and rules of court.123 Conflict-of-interest 
rules allowing lawyers to accept certain waivers arguably con-
template that lawyers will exercise that option in light of their 
fiduciary obligations.124 
The import of these limitations is unclear. The drafters 
may simply be recognizing the obvious: courts have the power 
to limit lawyers’ discretion by, for example, denying them the 
right to withdraw from a representation or compelling them to 
make unauthorized disclosures.125 If that is the case, the draft-
 
 121. See Haines v. Liggett Group, 814 F. Supp. 414, 425–26 (D.N.J. 1993) 
(overruling the requests of lawyers to withdraw even though it was clear that 
the lawyers would indeed suffer severe, unexpected financial hardship in con-
tinuing the representation); Cherokee Nation v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 15, 
17 (1998) (holding that even when the conditions for withdrawal under the 
professional rules are satisfied, courts may force a lawyer to continue the rep-
resentation if necessary to preserve judicial efficiency); Billings, Cunningham, 
Morgan & Boatwright, P.A. v. Isom, 701 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1997) (rejecting withdrawal seemingly authorized by the professional rules on 
the basis that the client’s independent interests outweighed those of the law 
firm—the firm had represented the client for a long time, and substitute coun-
sel would be difficult to find); see also Lindsay R. Goldstein, Note, A View from 
the Bench: Why Judges Fail to Protect Trust and Confidence in the Lawyer-
Client Relationship—An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2665, 2699–2704 (2005) (comparing courts’ responses in criminal and 
civil cases to withdrawal motions predicated on a breakdown in the attorney-
client relationship). 
 122. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2006) (“A lawyer 
may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
the lawyer believes reasonably necessary . . . to comply with other law or a 
court order.”). 
 123. See id. R. 3.4(c) (“A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obliga-
tion under the rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an as-
sertion that no valid obligation exists . . . .”). 
 124. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7(b) (allowing conflict waivers in specified circum-
stances); see also Zacharias, supra note 88, at 412–23 (discussing a lawyer’s 
obligations in evaluating client conflict waivers). 
 125. For example, some commentators have suggested that the codes re-
flect a different view of the appropriate contours of confidentiality than the 
judicial view. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 
N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1409–47 (1992) (comparing the separate visions of the bar 
and judiciary regarding attorney-client secrecy); Fred C. Zacharias, The Fal-
lacy That Attorney-Client Privilege Has Been Eroded: Ramifications and Les-
sons for the Bar, PROF. LAW., 1999 Symposium Issue, at 39, 40 (discussing the 
bar’s failure “to accept that its vision of appropriate secrecy . . . diverges from 
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ers are not affirmatively inviting courts to regulate lawyer dis-
cretion (and may even prefer that courts not do so), but are ac-
knowledging that when courts choose to impose obligations, 
lawyers will not be disciplined for complying. Alternatively, 
these provisions might reflect the drafters’ recognition that 
courts are in a superior position to make contemporaneous, ob-
jective determinations regarding whether or not lawyers should 
be allowed to withdraw or whether disclosures should be made 
in a particular situation. If that is the intent, court-imposed re-
strictions are consistent with both the letter and spirit of the 
rules’ grant of discretion. 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIMITS ON DISCRETION 
That the codes themselves may contemplate limits on law-
yers’ discretion affects how other lawmakers should regard per-
missive rules. Most obviously, when the codes impose limits, 
there is no inherent reason for other lawmakers to forebear 
from enforcing them.126 Thus, Russell’s and Gantt’s conclusions 
that mandatory rules sometimes require lawyers to counsel 
their clients about non-legal considerations might well justify 
the imposition of civil liability (e.g., for professional negligence) 
when a lawyer has failed to discuss non-legal considerations, or 
may justify the promulgation of administrative regulations that 
require such counseling. Similarly, insofar as permissive rules 
accede to other law and invite external lawmakers to develop 
limits, there is no reason why external regulators should de-
cline the invitation. They would not be encroaching on lawyer 
discretion so much as reinforcing a limitation recognized by the 
drafters themselves. 
Arguably, when code drafters include limitations on per-
missive authority that they have granted to lawyers, the draft-
ers are signaling that their commitment to informed self-
regulation is relatively weak. For example, the grant of occa-
sional discretion to reveal or keep secret client misconduct 
seems to be trumped by the requirement that lawyers correct 
 
the vision of judges evaluating claims of privilege”); Fred C. Zacharias, Har-
monizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 71–75 (1999) 
[hereinafter Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality] (explain-
ing the different conceptions of secrecy of the bar and judiciary). 
 126. That is not to say that ordinary constraints on other lawmakers might 
not cause them to forebear, but rather that the mere existence of permissive 
language in the ethics codes should not serve as an impediment to external 
regulation. 
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their clients’ and witnesses’ false testimony and remedy other 
frauds on the court.127 The limitation on discretion highlights 
the drafters’ conclusion that the public interest in the integrity 
of judicial proceedings outweighs the drafters’ general prefer-
ence for allowing lawyers to make individual decisions regard-
ing disclosure of client confidences. Given the weakness of the 
commitment to lawyer autonomy in the adjudicative context, 
external lawmakers might reasonably infer that, even from the 
drafters’ perspective, other public policy considerations can jus-
tify further limits. 
Suppose, however, that a code does not expressly limit a 
permissive rule. Should other lawmakers respect self-
regulation as the preferable regulatory alternative and forebear 
from imposing requirements or liability within the area that 
the rules leave to lawyers’ discretion? Any argument to this ef-
fect presupposes that by granting lawyers options, the code 
drafters made a normative judgment to which they believed 
other lawmakers should defer. In fact, however, code drafters 
develop permissive provisions for a variety of reasons—some 
normative, some not. The drafters’ expectations of whether ex-
ternal lawmakers will ratify the discretion delegated by a dis-
ciplinary rule may well depend upon the reasons why the codes 
have emphasized discretion in that particular rule. As dis-
cussed below, it is not ordinarily obvious from the face of a rule 
why the codes have permitted lawyers to choose their actions, 
nor is it always clear whether the drafters’ justification for ac-
cording discretion was meant to have implications for external 
lawmakers. 
III.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PERMISSIVE RULES   
Code drafters sometimes adopt rules that accord lawyers 
discretion because they believe that to be the correct approach 
and hope that other lawmakers will agree with, or accede to, 
the drafters’ normative judgment.128 In other instances, the 
 
 127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3), (b)–(c) (2006). 
 128. As Susan Koniak has pointed out, sometimes the drafters clearly in-
tend to establish the legal standard, fully expecting or hoping that courts and 
other law-making institutions will accept their approach. See Koniak, supra 
note 125, at 1411. The bar’s vision of the appropriate substantive law may, 
however, conflict with the view of other law-making institutions. Id. The nor-
mative view underlying the limited discretionary future harm exception to at-
torney-client confidentiality, for example, seems to be inconsistent with the 
views underlying both agency law, which allows agents to disclose to protect 
the superior interests of third parties, and judicial exceptions to attorney-
GREEN_ZACHARIAS_5FMT 12/22/2006 10:56:08 AM 
298 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:265 
 
drafters anticipate and accept that external lawmakers may 
reach different conclusions about the appropriate rule. That 
expectation may stem from the debatable nature of the issue or 
from the fact that the code drafters have limited the scope of 
their inquiry and the interests they have considered. As a con-
sequence, after the fact, it often is both possible to posit a range 
of explanations for a given discretionary rule and impossible to 
ascertain a clear intention on the drafters’ part to preempt 
other law. 
A. THE NORMATIVE JUDGMENT THAT THE PERMISSIVE 
APPROACH IS CORRECT ACROSS-THE-BOARD 
Permissive ethics rules reflect a variety of normative 
judgments that the code drafters may believe external lawmak-
ers should follow. First, the range of situations that a rule im-
plicates may both call for a balancing of interests and involve 
interests that individual lawyers can best understand and ac-
commodate. Second, lawyers’ personal interests in being able to 
select their conduct may warrant respect. Third, in situations 
in which lawyers must make difficult choices, the drafters may 
believe lawyers are entitled to deference, or room for error, 
when in hindsight their decisions prove to be wrong or ques-
tionable. Finally, the drafters may regard a discretionary rule 
as preferable simply because it is the lesser of two (or more) 
evils. 
The permissive future harm exceptions to attorney-client 
confidentiality129 typify ethics rules that can be explained on 
the basis of the drafters’ belief that lawyers should be allowed 
to balance moral and systemic considerations through case-by-
case decision making. Whether a lawyer should disclose a cli-
ent’s confidences to prevent or rectify serious harm to a third 
party when permitted to do so arguably depends upon a bal-
ance among client rights, society’s interest in the operation of 
the legal system (which lawyers have an interest in protecting), 
and moral or other societal considerations (which lawyers also 
have an interest in serving). How to strike the balance turns on 
the relative importance of preserving a client’s trust, the nature 
 
client privilege. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. f (1958) 
(“An agent is privileged to reveal information confidentially acquired by him in 
the course of his agency in the protection of a superior interest of himself or of 
a third person.”); see also Zacharias & Green, supra note 39, at 57–60 (discuss-
ing judicial interpretations of attorney-client secrecy requirements). 
 129. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006). 
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and seriousness of the risk to third parties, and the extent to 
which the client truly meant to entrust a confidence. A rule au-
thorizing lawyers to decide the disclosure issue on a case-
sensitive basis may be the best way to implement the norma-
tive judgment that balancing is appropriate and that lawyers 
are in a good (perhaps the best) position to strike the balance. 
Code drafters may prefer the permissive approach to an under- 
or over-inclusive alternative that would require lawyers always 
to disclose in certain categories of cases and never to disclose in 
others.130 
Other discretionary rules seem to focus on the rights of 
lawyers themselves, deeming lawyers’ interests paramount and 
therefore according lawyers autonomy to decide whether or not 
to promote those interests. This approach helps explain rules 
permitting lawyers to counsel clients about moral and political 
considerations131 and rules authorizing lawyers to withdraw 
when a client wishes to take a “repugnant” position.132 In many 
cases, client or public concerns may not provide a compelling 
reason for requiring lawyers to withdraw or to advise clients 
about non-legal factors. Yet individual lawyers may legiti-
mately believe that the dictates of competence, conscience, or 
their personal conception of the lawyer’s role warrants consid-
eration of moral or political issues. The advice and withdrawal 
rules appear to reflect the code drafters’ judgment that these 
lawyers’ beliefs should be respected, at least to the extent of 
protecting their ability to engage in moral or political counsel-
ing and to avoid personal participation in cases that offend 
them. The permissive nature of the rules enables lawyers to 
 
 130. See generally J. Michael Callan & Harris David, Professional Respon-
sibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an 
Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 355–56 (1976) (discussing ration-
ales for permissive disclosure of clients’ intended crimes); Leslie C. Levin, 
Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who 
Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 101 (1994) (same). In contrast, 
mandatory disclosure rules drafted by other lawmakers—such as the proposed 
SEC regulations implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act—reflect the opposite 
normative judgment. Their premise is either that balancing is inappropriate 
or that lawyers are not uniquely situated to determine the appropriate ac-
commodation of interests. 
 131. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2006). 
 132. Id. R. 1.16(b)(4). The future harm exceptions have similarly been ex-
plained by some as respecting a lawyer’s autonomy. See, e.g., Harry I. Subin, 
The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 
IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1175 (1985) (advocating a mandatory disclosure rule, but 
acknowledging that such a rule would infringe lawyers’ autonomy). 
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address concerns of conscience to the extent they deem it ap-
propriate to raise them, but at the same time maintains the 
codes’ key elements of client-orientation, role-differentiation, 
and zealous advocacy. 
Another situation in which code drafters may predicate a 
permissive rule on normative considerations that they expect 
other lawmakers to accept occurs when the drafters impose 
particularly difficult decision-making responsibilities but do not 
believe that an attorney deserves sanction for implementing 
those responsibilities in good faith if the attorney’s decision 
proves faulty. In other words, fairness may require that in 
some situations lawyers be accorded a measure of leeway, or 
wriggle room, pursuant to which they can make their best 
judgments free from fear of punishment. This understanding 
probably underlies rules allowing lawyers to decline to present 
suspected perjury in civil cases.133 In the absence of discretion, 
lawyers would be forbidden to introduce testimony they know 
to be false but be required to introduce helpful testimony that 
they merely believe is false; the propriety of the lawyer’s con-
duct would turn on the lawyer’s actual knowledge, and there 
would be no room for error. When it is unclear whether the in-
formation in a lawyer’s possession rises to the level of knowl-
edge or to mere suspicion that the client’s proposed testimony 
will be false, any decision by the lawyer creates considerable 
disciplinary risk. The permissive ethics provision arguably ob-
viates that risk by according the lawyer discretion in close 
cases. 
Finally, some permissive provisions may be explicable not 
based on the affirmative utility of discretion but simply as be-
ing preferable to the likely alternatives. For example, as de-
scribed in the Introduction, the ABA faced pressure following 
the collapse of Enron and other corporate scandals to adopt 
mandatory disclosure obligations, but responded by expanding 
its permissive provisions. Proponents argued, among other 
things, that permissive disclosure is preferable to mandatory 
reporting because clients who are aware of a disclosure obliga-
 
 133. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2006). It has 
been noted that the future harm exceptions to confidentiality similarly obviate 
the need to decide on which side of the line a case falls. See Donald L. Burnett, 
Jr., The Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct: Critical Concerns for Military 
Lawyers, ARMY LAW., Feb. 1987, at 19, 23 (noting difficult decisions under 
proposed military rules of professional conduct, under which disclosure would 
be mandatory to avert certain harms, and otherwise would be impermissible). 
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tion will be less willing to retain and confide in lawyers134 and 
because risk-averse lawyers will withdraw from representation 
at the first hint of client misconduct, thereby denying clients 
wise and informed counsel.135 The proponents evidently per-
suaded the rule-drafting body that the permissive approach 
better supports the lawyer’s role in promoting compliance with 
the law. 
The justifications discussed above all reflect decisions by 
the code drafters that, on balance, discretion is the preferable 
approach to regulating a particular area of professional con-
duct. Such judgments ordinarily imply a belief that other law-
makers should reach the same conclusion.136 Nevertheless, the 
terms of permissive rules seldom make clear whether the rules 
are based on these kinds of considerations. 
By way of example, consider yet again the future harm ex-
ceptions to confidentiality. One might argue that their purpose 
is less to implement a normative judgment about the complex-
ity of balancing competing interests than to promote the per-
ceived interest of particular lawyers in “bring[ing] their per-
sonal conscience and morality to bear in deciding whether 
to . . . prevent criminal activity by a client.”137 Alternatively, 
their purpose may be to provide some margin of error in the 
space between those situations in which lawyers must disclose 
client confidences (e.g., when necessary to avoid assisting a cli-
ent’s crime or fraud)138 and those situations where lawyers may 
not disclose intended client wrongdoing (e.g., when it is not suf-
ficiently certain that the client’s conduct is criminal or fraudu-
lent, that substantial harm will result, or that the lawyer’s ser-
vices are implicated).139 As discussed below in Parts III.B and 
 
 134. Letter from ABA to SEC, supra note 25 (arguing that a proposed re-
quirement that lawyers notify the SEC of withdrawal and disaffirm specific 
documents would undermine corporations’ trust in their lawyers); Letter from 
the Bd. of Dirs. of the Am. Corporate Counsel Ass’n to Jonathan G. Katz, 
Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/s74502/bnagler1.htm [hereinafter Letter from ACCA to SEC] 
(same). 
 135. See Letter from ACCA to SEC, supra note 134. 
 136. That does not mean, however, that lawmakers always agree. Indeed, 
in some instances, code drafters have adopted ethics regulations for the very 
purpose of influencing or contradicting contrary substantive law. See Koniak, 
supra note 125, at 1411. 
 137. Steven C. Krane, Don’t Tell Anyone (Our Confidentiality Rules Are 
Changing), N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., May 2005, at 28, 29. 
 138. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2006). 
 139. See id. R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3). 
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III.C, the provisions might equally be explained on the basis of 
separate reasons that do not reflect any normative judgment to 
which the drafters would want, or expect, other lawmakers to 
defer. 
B. THE NORMATIVE JUDGMENT THAT THE PERMISSIVE 
APPROACH IS PREFERABLE FOR DISCIPLINARY PURPOSES BUT 
NOT NECESSARILY FOR OTHER LEGAL PURPOSES 
Code drafters might adopt permissive ethics provisions as-
suming that they reflect the preferable disciplinary standard, 
yet nonetheless anticipate that other lawmakers may appropri-
ately set regulatory standards mandating or forbidding specific 
conduct within the area of discretion identified by the ethics 
code. There are a variety of reasons for code drafters to adopt 
this approach. 
One set of rationales stems from the difficulty of drawing 
bright-line rules that cover all situations lawyers are likely to 
confront. Consider, again, the confidentiality exceptions per-
mitting disclosure of client wrongdoing. There are strong policy 
justifications for and against these exceptions. On the one 
hand, clients’ interests in secrecy and loyalty and the legal sys-
tem’s interest in promoting future clients’ trust in lawyers fa-
vor confidentiality. On the other hand, society’s immediate in-
terest in preventing misconduct often favors disclosure. The 
appropriate balance in any case may well depend upon the na-
ture of the misconduct and its effect, the likelihood that it will 
occur without disclosure or be prevented with disclosure, the 
impact of disclosure on the client, and other fact-sensitive con-
siderations. Bright-line rules—for example, requiring lawyers 
to report a client’s intent to commit specified crimes of violence 
but forbidding lawyers to disclose other intended wrongdoing—
arguably are both over- and under-inclusive; in at least some 
cases, violent crimes should not be reported and other wrongdo-
ing should be reported.140 
 
 140. Consider, for example, two clients. The first tells the lawyer, “I’m go-
ing to punch my neighbor in the nose for killing my dog,” while the second—a 
client in a routine real estate closing—confides that he plans to launder money 
for Al Qaeda. Disclosing the first client’s confidence may destroy the working 
relationship the lawyer has with the client in the separate representation, and 
the warning to the neighbor may add little to what the neighbor already 
knows. The importance to society of disclosing the second client’s confidence, 
in contrast, may outweigh the need to preserve the client’s trust. 
GREEN_ZACHARIAS_5FMT 12/22/2006 10:56:08 AM 
2006]  PERMISSIVE ETHICS RULES 303 
 
Code drafters might reasonably conclude that according 
lawyers discretion to make appropriate decisions in individual 
cases is a better alternative than binding lawyers to an inflexi-
ble categorical mandate. This drafting choice, however, may not 
reflect an expectation that other lawmakers will defer to lawyer 
discretion. It may simply reflect a judgment that reasonable 
observers can take opposite positions on the disputed issue. The 
fact that the code takes one approach does not mean that the 
drafters would not accept that external lawmakers might reach 
the conclusion—perhaps even the correct conclusion—that a 
mandatory rule is preferable. 
More significantly, the drafters’ conclusion that only a 
permissive standard can adequately address the plethora of po-
tential cases is perfectly consistent with the expectation that 
other lawmakers may adopt mandatory rules for subcategories 
of cases in which concrete standards make sense. A state legis-
lature, for example, might adopt a reporting law that requires 
all professionals, including lawyers, to report ongoing incidents 
of serious child abuse.141 Although it is conceivable that the 
drafters of the permissive ethics rule would conclude that law-
yers should have discretion not to report child abuse, it is 
equally conceivable that the drafters would agree that disclo-
sure should be made in that subclass of cases. 
Likewise, a rule permitting lawyers to counsel clients 
about moral and political considerations142 may be based on the 
drafters’ judgment that such counseling is sometimes appropri-
ate and sometimes not, and that no uniformly correct approach 
can be encapsulated in a single rule. The conflict-of-interest 
rules, in allowing lawyers to accept particular conflict waiv-
ers,143 arguably reflect the drafters’ understanding that some-
times clients who understand the consequences will benefit by 
waiving the conflict, while in other cases lawyers’ refusal to ac-
cept waivers will best serve the clients’ interests.144 Neither of 
these permissive rules, however, eliminates the possibility that 
the drafters would accept a legislative conclusion that lawyers 
should act in a particular way in subcategories of cases.145 
 
 141. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.005–
.010 (2003). 
 142. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2006). 
 143. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7. 
 144. See Zacharias, supra note 88, at 412–23 (discussing the reasons for 
honoring and for overriding client consent to conflicted representation). 
 145. For example, Congress has adopted legislation that precludes conflict 
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A second set of reasons why code drafters might adopt a 
permissive rule yet accept the possibility that alternative law-
makers will produce mandatory or prohibitive standards de-
rives from the limited interests that the professional codes 
typically address. Most ethics regulation focuses on particular 
systemic concerns, including client protection, enhancing public 
trust and respect for the profession, assuring that legitimate 
third-party interests are safeguarded (in at least a procedural 
sense), promoting the operation of the adversary system, main-
taining efficient judicial administration, and (occasionally) im-
plementing more general societal interests. Code drafters often 
adopt permissive rules that, in their view, properly balance the 
interests that the codes address, while still assuming that other 
lawmakers might adjust the balance when taking other consid-
erations into account. 
A permissive exception to confidentiality, for example, may 
reflect a judgment that the lawyer should be given a choice 
about how to proceed, based on the assessment that this ap-
proach best accommodates client, third-party, and societal in-
terests in disclosure. That conclusion does not, however, gain-
say the possibility that societal interests in mitigating 
widespread corporate misconduct at a particular time in history 
might justify an SEC regulation that mandates disclosures by 
corporate attorneys. 
Indeed, a permissive ethics rule may reflect the code draft-
ers’ indifference to how lawyers act, at least with respect to the 
interests that the ethics code is intended to further. This atti-
tude helps explain the rule permitting contingent fees. Outside 
the matrimonial and criminal contexts, code drafters may per-
ceive no ethics-based interest that would justify either compel-
ling or forbidding a lawyer to represent a client for a contingent 
fee. That does not mean, however, that society should be power-
 
waivers in the bankruptcy context. See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2000). A legislature 
might also reasonably adopt bright-line rules forbidding lawyers to accept con-
flict waivers from minors or mentally disabled persons. In the counseling 
situation, it might be appropriate for a legislature to insist upon moral coun-
seling when a corporate client determines that its product threatens to harm 
some users (or employees involved in the manufacturing process) but that the 
benefit of the product outweighs the potential liability costs. Cf. Gantt, supra 
note 109, at 419–20 (“[A]ttorneys may be ethically obligated at times either to 
advise clients on the nonlegal issues that relate to the legal issues in the rep-
resentation or, at a minimum, to raise the nonlegal issues with their clients 
and instruct them to seek expert advice in those other fields.”). 
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less to conclude that in particular types of litigation, limits are 
necessary to protect clients from exploitation.146 
Alternatively, one can conceive of situations in which code 
drafters view the competing ethics interests as being in com-
plete equipoise and therefore allow lawyers’ personal interests 
to tip the balance. This approach might explain aspects of rules 
allowing lawyers to withdraw from representation, for example 
when a client uses (or has used) a lawyer’s services to commit a 
fraud.147 The interests in protecting the public and in promot-
ing public confidence in the profession compete against client 
interests in confidentiality and zealous representation. To the 
extent the code drafters determine that neither set of interests 
is dominant, they may deem it fairest to allow each lawyer to 
decide whether to continue the representation in light of the 
lawyer’s own interests.148 
Insofar as a grant of discretion is a product of indifference, 
the code drafters presumably do not mean to supersede alter-
native regulation that narrows the lawyer’s discretion in order 
to promote interests different from those underlying the ethics 
codes.149 The rulemakers may even invite external lawmakers 
 
 146. For example, Congress might have adopted legislation forbidding rep-
resentation of parties on a contingent fee basis before the September 11 claims 
tribunal, based on a legislative view that the claimants had adequate access to 
lawyers who would competently represent them at lower cost for a fixed or 
hourly fee and that, insofar as possible, the awards should be preserved for the 
benefit of the claimants, not their lawyers. Such legislation would not neces-
sarily have been inconsistent with the judgments underlying the general rule 
permitting contingent fees. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i)(2) 
(2006); see also Assistance Program Under the 9/11 Heroes Stamp Act of 2001, 
70 Fed. Reg. 43,214, 43,215 (July 26, 2005) (to be codified at 44 C.F.R. pt. 153); 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief, Procedure, and Justice: The September 11th 
Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 496 n.219 (2003) (citing Kenneth 
Feinberg, Presentation at Brooklyn/Cardozo Faculty Workshop on Ethical, 
Economic, and Social Issues in Mass Torts (Nov. 4, 2003)) (observing that 
when families of those who died in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
were represented on a contingent fee basis, the fee was ordinarily eight to ten 
percent of the recovery). 
 147. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(2)–(3) (2006). 
 148. The lawyer’s own interests may include, for example, the lawyer’s 
business interest in continuing lucrative engagements, on the one hand, or the 
interest in avoiding civil liability and preserving a reputation for professional 
integrity, on the other. 
 149. It is important to note the difference between the normative judgment 
that fairness requires a sanction-free zone, on the one hand, and purely self-
serving judgments on the part of the bar, on the other. Rules that provide a 
zone of discretion as a means of enabling or facilitating the exercise of lawyers’ 
responsibilities to clients or the system reflect a normative judgment that a 
safe harbor for lawyers helps the system operate appropriately. Self-serving 
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to restrict the lawyer’s discretion. Standard withdrawal rules, 
for example, identify circumstances in which lawyers may ter-
minate representation, but specifically note that courts have 
supplemental interests in avoiding undue delay or expense 
arising from substitution of counsel. These rules contemplate 
that when a lawyer seeks judicial permission to withdraw, the 
ruling court will take its own institutional interests into ac-
count. A denial of leave to withdraw is not inconsistent with 
the judgment underlying the permissive withdrawal provisions, 
at least insofar as the court is implementing institutional con-
cerns that the ethics rule did not resolve. 
One can interpret the permissive withdrawal rules in yet 
another way that reflects both a normative judgment by the 
drafters and an acceptance of the possibility that other law-
making institutions may disagree. Code drafters know that at 
least some of their rules will, or may, co-exist with inconsistent 
judicial or legislative requirements, with each standard govern-
ing decision making in the sphere controlled by the rule-
making institution. Thus, for example, code drafters seem to 
envision conflict-of-interest rules as governing disciplinary 
cases, but judicial disqualification standards as governing law-
yer conduct within litigation.150 One can conceptualize attor-
 
rules, which sometimes include immunity from sanctions for improper con-
duct, simply seek to confer a benefit upon the bar. 
Of course, some rules can be viewed as fitting either category. For exam-
ple, the permissive future harm exceptions to attorney-client confidentiality 
facilitate lawyers’ ability to make the difficult decision to turn against the cli-
ent, but they also arguably provide a shield for lawyers who fail to disclose 
confidences in order to preserve third-party interests. Cf. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 54(1) (2000) (“A lawyer is not li-
able under § 48 or § 49 for any action or inaction the lawyer reasonably be-
lieved to be required by law, including a professional rule.”). Rules allowing 
lawyers to counsel clients regarding ongoing or planned illegal conduct pur-
port to relieve lawyers of uncertainty in determining whether their counsel 
constitutes unlawfully assisting the clients in the commission of the crime, but 
they ostensibly provide a similar shield. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 9 (2006) (“Nor does the fact that a client uses [a lawyer’s] ad-
vice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer 
a party to the course of action.”). 
 150. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof ’l Ethics, Op. 720 (1999) 
(“The standard employed in ruling on disqualification motions is not invaria-
bly the same as the standard under the applicable disciplinary rules. In some 
cases, courts will decline to disqualify a law firm, even though its representa-
tion would appear to be forbidden by the disciplinary rules, in light of the cli-
ent’s interest in preserving an ongoing . . . relation with its chosen counsel and 
other considerations of fairness and economy.”); see also Green, supra note 11, 
at 74–83 (describing courts’ development of disqualification doctrine inde-
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ney-client secrecy standards in the same way. The code drafters 
have a normative view concerning appropriate secrecy; profes-
sional confidentiality rules control lawyer discipline. But the 
drafters also seem to acknowledge that other institutions, espe-
cially courts, have a narrower normative view (reflected in at-
torney-client privilege standards) which takes precedence once 
lawyers become involved in litigation.151 
Finally, code drafters might adopt a discretionary approach 
simply because they despair of resolving a controversial issue 
for whole categories of cases in which reasonable observers dif-
fer about the correct approach. The debate regarding the ap-
propriate conduct of lawyers when they believe (but do not 
know) that a client’s testimony is false has long divided the 
bar.152 A rule leaving the decision to lawyers153 not only allows 
individual attorneys to resolve diverse cases differently, but 
also avoids having proponents of one arguably legitimate nor-
mative view impose their beliefs on proponents of the opposite, 
but also legitimate, view. The decision to leave the issue to in-
dividual decision making is normative in the sense that code 
drafters conclude that individual decisions will be at least as 
valid as a categorical decision encapsulated in a rule, yet it is 
also non-normative in the sense that it fails to adopt any solu-
tion as correct. A decision by alternative lawmakers who be-
lieve that they can reach a correct conclusion on the issue 
therefore cannot be viewed as inconsistent with the normative 
judgments of the professional rulemakers. 
 
pendently from the conflict rules). 
 151. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2006) (au-
thorizing lawyers to disclose confidences in order “to comply with other law or 
a court order”). 
 152. The most pointed example of this debate was the work of Monroe 
Freedman in the mid-1960’s and the responses of David Bress and John 
Noonan. Compare Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the 
Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 
1469, 1478 (1966) (discussing, inter alia, defense lawyers’ obligations when a 
client wishes to commit perjury), with David G. Bress, Professional Ethics in 
Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel’s Responsibility, 64 MICH. L. REV. 
1493, 1494–97 (1966) (disagreeing with Monroe Freedman’s resolutions of “the 
three hardest [ethical] questions” for criminal defense attorneys), and John T. 
Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. 
L. REV. 1485, 1487–92 (1966) (responding to Freedman’s arguments in favor of 
broad confidentiality). 
 153. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2006). 
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C. PROCEDURAL OR STOP-GAP JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PERMISSIVE 
RULES 
Thus far, we have considered only normative justifications 
for permissive rules—decisions by code drafters to adopt a 
permissive rule because they have a normative preference for 
lawyer discretion. Permissive rules may be adopted for many 
other reasons, however. 
One can easily imagine situations in which code drafters 
adopt permissive rules for practical reasons. Of course, when 
doing so, code drafters ordinarily will make their best efforts to 
define an appropriate ethics standard. Nevertheless, the code 
drafters may be perfectly willing to defer to external lawmak-
ers’ alternative resolutions of the issues. Indeed, the drafters 
may even be attempting to codify or predict what they believe 
to be the external lawmakers’ preferences. Under these circum-
stances, the code drafters should be prepared to cede authority 
to the alternative regulatory institutions when those institu-
tions adopt a contrary standard. 
One important function of the legal ethics codes is to in-
form lawyers about the lawfulness and appropriateness of be-
havior.154 In adopting some permissive rules, code drafters per-
ceive themselves merely as codifying155 or supplementing 
existing legal standards.156 Other permissive rules seek to fill 
gaps in the law157 or, as discussed below, clarify extra-code 
standards. 
Lawyers are particularly likely to be confused about how to 
act when legal standards are ambiguous or in flux. Permissive 
rules can serve the codes’ guidance function by advising the 
practicing bar that conduct deemed improper under previous 
legal standards or professional norms is becoming accepted. By 
making the standard discretionary, code drafters either inform 
 
 154. See Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Codes, supra note 8, at 231–
32 (discussing the purposes of ethics codes). 
 155. See Munneke & Davis, supra note 9, at 42–43 (asserting that Model 
Rule 1.9 is a codification of court-made law defining “the substantive standard 
for successive conflicts of interest”). 
 156. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Codes, supra note 8, at 232 (not-
ing that “drafters sometimes have attempted to supplement the substantive 
law”). 
 157. See Munneke & Davis, supra note 9, at 43 (discussing Model Rule 1.5 
as an example in which the codes recognize lawyers’ customary standard of 
behavior in dividing fees). 
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lawyers to look to the changing case law or suggest directly 
that particular conduct is legal but remains controversial. 
Perhaps the best examples are ethics rules that allow law-
yers to accept contingent fees158 and to advance certain costs on 
behalf of some litigants.159 When adopted, these rules ad-
dressed doubt about the propriety of such conduct that 
stemmed from nineteenth- and early twentieth-century law 
deeming activities promoting litigation to be improper cham-
perty or barratry.160 With the due process161 and legal advertis-
ing162 revolutions came acceptance of the notion that behavior 
by lawyers that informs the public and makes representation 
more freely available to consumers of legal services can be 
beneficial to society.163 Traditional restrictions on lawyer activi-
ties that served these ends—including restrictions on advertis-
ing, contingent fee representation, certain kinds of solicitation, 
and providing financial support for class action litigation and 
indigent plaintiffs—changed slowly, and some of these limita-
tions remained on the books even as it became clear that courts 
would no longer countenance them.164 The modern contingent 
 
 158. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(i)(2) (2006). 
 159. See, e.g., id. R. 1.8(e). 
 160. In other words, the earlier law deemed litigation to be a bad thing, 
and financial devices that enabled lawyers to facilitate the filing of lawsuits 
were to be discouraged. See R.D. Cox, Champerty as We Know It, 13 MEMP. ST. 
U. L. REV. 139, 153 (1983) (“The common law . . . prohibited one from even en-
couraging a present or prospective plaintiff in his lawsuit, absent a justifying 
relationship.”); Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers’ Contracts Is Different, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 443, 473 (1998) (“[M]edieval society frowned on lawyers 
marketing their services . . . . [I]t was the financing of litigation that was dis-
quieting and prohibited.”). 
 161. See Zacharias, supra note 78, at 1318–20 (discussing the effects of the 
due process revolution in criminal cases on the role of lawyers in civil litiga-
tion). 
 162. See J. GORDON HYLTON, PROFESSIONAL VALUES AND INDIVIDUAL 
AUTONOMY: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND LAWYER ADVERTISING 
36–41 (1998) (discussing the shift in legal doctrine governing legal advertis-
ing); Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal 
Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 
87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 995–96 (2002) (discussing the history of lawyer advertis-
ing regulation). 
 163. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978) (allow-
ing limited regulation of lawyers’ in-person solicitation of clients); Bates v. 
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383–84 (1977) (finding lawyer advertising to 
be constitutionally protected). 
 164. See Zacharias, supra note 162, at 996 n.116 (discussing the regulatory 
resistance to changes in advertising and solicitation rules). 
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fee and financial support rules served notice on lawyers of the 
change in legal standards. 
Similarly, rules allowing lawyers to inform the courts 
about known client perjury were adopted in the wake of a 
heated debate about whether lawyers must honor confidential-
ity, on the one hand, or their disclosure obligations as officers of 
the court, on the other.165 Lawyers’ legal obligations in the per-
jury context were unclear and, as a result, the early codes also 
remained ambiguous on the issue.166 The Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Nix v. Whiteside, however, tipped the balance.167 In 
that case, the Supreme Court held that a defendant has no 
right to commit perjury and therefore no right to assistance in 
doing so.168 Nix by itself did not change the law, for the Court 
had no jurisdiction to revise state ethics codes. The Nix decision 
itself purported to apply Iowa’s standards.169 Nevertheless, the 
Court’s pronouncements signaled that requiring lawyers to dis-
close perjurious clients’ confidences was a legitimate, constitu-
 
 165. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 166. In Nix v. Whiteside, for example, the court of appeals concluded that 
the defendant’s lawyer had failed to provide effective assistance of counsel 
when he threatened that if the client testified falsely, the lawyer would dis-
close to the court that the client had done so. See 744 F.2d 1323, 1330–31 (8th 
Cir. 1985). But the Supreme Court squarely disagreed, holding that a defen-
dant has no right to commit perjury and therefore no right to assistance in do-
ing so. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168 (1986). This disagreement re-
flected the ambiguity of the then-prevailing codes of ethics. The Model Code, 
which was still the model for many states’ rules, prohibited lawyers from 
“[k]nowingly us[ing] perjured testimony” but did not authorize them to dis-
close after-the-fact that a client had committed perjury because the confiden-
tiality duty took precedence. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 
7-102 (1980). Further, many courts believed that the criminal defendant’s 
right to testify meant that, to comply with the prohibition of presenting false 
testimony, lawyers were required to offer their clients’ false testimony in the 
form of a “narrative.” The then-existing Model Rules, in contrast, did not allow 
a lawyer to disclose a client’s intent to commit perjury, but did require lawyers 
to remedy past frauds upon a tribunal. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.6(b), 3.3(a) (1983). 
 167. See 475 U.S 157 (1986). 
 168. See id. at 163 (rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s holding that the defen-
dant’s lawyer failed to provide effective assistance of counsel when he threat-
ened that he would inform the court if the defendant testified falsely). 
 169. Ironically, the Supreme Court misread the professional rules, stating 
that the Iowa code and the Model Code both provided that an “attorney’s reve-
lation of his client’s perjury to the court is a professionally responsible and ac-
ceptable response to the conduct of a client who has actually given perjured 
testimony.” Id. at 170. These codes, however, only forbade a lawyer’s knowing 
use of perjured testimony, but did not necessarily allow disclosure of perjury 
after the fact. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980). 
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tional approach,170 and as a result many states adopted such a 
requirement.171 The ABA’s promulgation of a model rule that 
implemented Nix’s approach, allowing lawyers to disclose client 
perjury in criminal cases, foreshadowed this result. 
What is important to note about these changes is that the 
code drafters’ standards arguably were not intended to estab-
lish a unique normative view that might stand in opposition to 
the view of other law-making institutions. Rather, the drafters 
either followed changes in legal standards already in progress 
or anticipated that the law would change. Viewed fairly, code 
provisions adopted for these reasons should not inhibit law-
makers from later departing from the code drafters’ formula-
tion, either because the drafters misunderstood how the law 
was evolving or because further change seems desirable. 
This situation arguably differs from one in which legal 
standards for lawyer behavior are clear and established, yet fail 
to specify behavior for particular circumstances. The law of at-
torney-client privilege, for example, encompasses lawyers’ obli-
gations to maintain client secrets and to disclose limited cate-
gories of information, but it applies only in litigation.172 It does 
not tell lawyers how to act when possessed of secrets they 
would like to disclose for moral reasons, but which have not 
been demanded in testimony or discovery. Attorney-client con-
fidentiality rules fill that gap. The future harm exceptions to 
confidentiality arguably require lawyers to balance and con-
sider factors that are pertinent to disclosure in the nonlitiga-
tion setting.173 
 
 170. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 171 (finding professional standards allowing the 
disclosure of client perjury to be “reasonable” and constitutional). 
 171. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Lying Clients: An Age Old Problem, 26 LITI-
GATION 19, 23 (1999) (categorizing Tennessee as an example of a state that 
adopted the ABA’s view, New York as “adher[ing] to the [ABA’s] earlier posi-
tion,” and Florida as “tak[ing] a more demanding view than the ABA”); cf. 
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987), in 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ANTHOLOGY 65 (Thomas Metzloff ed., 1994) 
(revising the ABA’s position on lawyers’ obligations in light of the new Model 
Rules). 
 172. See Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, supra note 
125, at 71. 
 173. Lawyers thus may consider the likelihood and extent of the harm the 
client will cause, but may also consider such factors as the need for disclosure, 
the effect disclosure will have on the lawyer’s relationship with the client, and 
the impact on the legal system (in particular, on other clients’ willingness to 
trust lawyers) if the disclosure is publicized. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethink-
ing Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 358–62 (1988) (discussing the justifi-
cations for maintaining strict confidentiality). 
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When code drafters fill gaps in the law, their intentions 
typically are unclear. The drafters may simply be trying to pre-
dict the alternative lawmakers’ preferences, in which case the 
code should be deemed subordinate to, and anticipatory of, sub-
sequent decisions by the alternative regulators. It is, however, 
equally possible that the code drafters are seeking to influence 
subsequent decisions or that they perceive that the alternative 
regulators have intentionally left the matter subject to their 
control. The resulting ethics provisions may constitute a de-
termination that discretion is an appropriate resolution that all 
regulators should accept. 
D. SELF-SERVING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PERMISSIVE RULES 
Bar associations rarely advocate the adoption of rules on 
the express basis that the rules benefit lawyers (economically 
or psychologically) or the bar organization itself. Yet there is 
little doubt that ethics codes traditionally have included self-
serving propositions.174 
Discretionary rules can benefit lawyers financially. Grants 
of permission to accept waivers of conflicts of interest can au-
thorize lawyers to accept some lucrative representations that, 
on a strict reading of a client’s best interests, the lawyer should 
perhaps refuse.175 Rules allowing lawyers to accept cases on a 
limited basis176 or to advance expenses177 also facilitate law-
yers’ ability to secure business. 
 
Similarly, agency law generally informs lawyers of their obligations to 
their principals, including clients. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 1.01 cmt. e (2006) (“[A]n agent must act loyally in the principal’s interest as 
well as on the principal’s behalf. ”). Yet it is silent on whether and how agents 
are permitted to consider moral and political factors in advising their princi-
pals. Rules like Model Rule 2.1 serve to fill that gap. See, e.g., MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2006). 
 174. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II: Is Confidential-
ity Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601, 628 nn.138–39, 629–30 nn.144–45 
(1989) (identifying rules that have been questioned as self-serving). 
 175. On the surface, when conflict-of-interest rules allow lawyers to accept 
client waivers, the rules authorize the representation so long as the rules’ pre-
requisites are satisfied. An alternative interpretation of the rules is that the 
lawyer still may have some obligation to consider systemic interests and the 
lawyer’s own fiduciary obligations to the clients in deciding whether to par-
ticipate. See Zacharias, supra note 88, at 432–33 (discussing the limits of per-
missible waivers); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Limits on Client Autonomy in 
Legal Ethics Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 199, 222 (2001) (discussing the rea-
sons for limiting client autonomy in the conflict-of-interest context). 
 176. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2006); cf. Fred 
C. Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements: Should Clients Get What They 
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The bar organization itself may have self-serving—
typically political—reasons for adopting discretionary rules. 
Making conduct permissive often enables the drafters to obtain 
consensus concerning a rule that otherwise would not be 
adopted by the voting body, because the discretion enables both 
proponents and opponents of the conduct in question to con-
tinue acting as they prefer. Such a compromise probably ac-
counts for the ABA’s continued reliance on a permissive form of 
the harm-prevention exception to attorney-client confidential-
ity.178 Alternatively, changing mandatory requirements into 
permissive standards can be part of a log-rolled package that 
enables the drafters of a whole code to secure adoption of other 
provisions.179 
To the extent one identifies self-interested financial or po-
litical motivations for adopting a permissive rule, the code 
drafters’ imprimatur on discretion provides little support for 
the proposition that other lawmakers should respect the rule. It 
is, however, important to distinguish purely self-serving provi-
sions from those that purport to immunize lawyers from disci-
pline or liability on the basis that failing to do so may chill ef-
 
Pay For?, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 915, 946 (1998) (arguing that the ability of 
lawyers to limit the scope of representation may be constrained by fiduciary 
obligations to clients); Fred C. Zacharias, Reply to Hyman and Silver: Clients 
Shouldn’t Get Less Than They Deserve, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 981, 984–85 
(1998) (clarifying when lawyers should be limited in their ability to accept lim-
ited engagements). 
 177. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2006). 
 178. See Kalish, supra note 9, at 656 (explaining that code drafters are of-
ten influenced by “politics and lobbying”); Manuel Berrelez et al., Note, Disap-
pearing Dilemmas: Judicial Construction of Ethical Choice as Strategic Behav-
ior in the Criminal Defense Context, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 225, 262 (2005) 
(lauding the drafters for attempting to reach “workable compromises” for 
moral dilemmas). 
 179. Code drafters’ political motivations may be at odds with their genuine 
normative judgments. Consider, for example, the ABA’s post-Enron adoption 
of additional future harm exceptions to address financial misconduct. See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2006); Am. Bar Ass’n Task 
Force on Corporate Responsibility, supra note 25. For years, the ABA leader-
ship considered and rejected these additions, believing that lawyers should be 
required to preserve confidentiality in cases of client fraud. In 2003, however, 
the ABA anticipated that unless it adopted a provision permitting lawyers to 
report client frauds (under narrow circumstances), the SEC would adopt an 
administrative regulation mandating disclosure. See Morgan, supra note 23, 
at 15–17. The normative view underlying the rule was probably not that law-
yers should sometimes report client fraud or that, as a matter of autonomy, 
lawyers should be allowed to do so. Rather, the judgment was simply that, as 
between a permissive or mandatory reporting rule, a permissive rule is prefer-
able. 
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fective representation. In the latter context, lawyers benefit 
from receiving immunity, but the separate interests of clients 
or the legal system may justify the benefit. 
IV.  RAMIFICATIONS FOR CODE DRAFTERS AND  
OTHER LAWMAKERS   
A. UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE CODE DRAFTERS’ INTENT 
This Article has noted a range of reasons why professional 
code drafters might adopt a permissive rule that seems to give 
lawyers discretion to determine appropriate conduct. Some of 
these reasons reflect a normative judgment that attorney dis-
cretion in the covered situation is valuable in its own right. In 
reaching that judgment, the code drafters sometimes intend or 
anticipate that other lawmakers will respect the grant of dis-
cretion, sometimes expect the development of external limita-
tions on the general grant of discretion, and sometimes expect 
the grant of discretion to be honored only in particular con-
texts. With respect to other permissive rules, the justifications 
are more practical—sometimes even self-serving—and do not 
warrant deference when other regulators consider diverging 
from the rules. 
Whether particular rules contemplate that external regula-
tors will defer to the code drafters’ judgments often is not clear 
from the face of the rules. For example, in adopting discretion-
ary waiver provisions in conflict-of-interest rules, the drafters 
of the 1983 Model Rules knew that courts would need to ad-
dress the same issues in deciding disqualification issues.180 The 
drafters may have sought to influence court decisions. Alterna-
tively, they may have anticipated that courts would rely on 
their own institutional interests to disqualify lawyers in some 
cases even when the conflict rule permits the representation.181 
 
 180. See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Repre-
sentation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion 
and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV. 211, 288 (1982) (analyzing the proposed 
Model Rules and concluding that it “would be far better to acknowledge the 
difficulty of review in some cases and admit that in some of those situations 
the enforcement goal must be subordinated to the goal of articulating stan-
dards that allow an honest practitioner to make decisions that he believes are 
consistent with relevant ethical principles”). 
 181. The drafters knew that courts would diverge from the rules in the op-
posite direction. They surely anticipated that courts, for institutional and 
practical reasons—including clients’ interest in preserving an ongoing attor-
ney-client relationship—sometimes would not disqualify lawyers even though 
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The rules may not even reveal whether they reflect a nor-
mative judgment that lawyer autonomy should be respected or 
whether the drafters simply were unable to draft a mandatory 
rule that captured appropriate distinctions. The rule on moral 
and political counseling, for example, might have been intended 
to encourage lawyers to provide moral and philosophical per-
spectives to clients or it might reflect the difficulty of distin-
guishing cases in which lawyers should be required to give such 
counseling from those in which lawyers should be forbidden 
from doing so as a matter of competence. Similarly, conflict-of-
interest rules permitting lawyers to accept particular conflict 
waivers can be explained in alternate ways.182 
This kind of ambiguity presents a conundrum. If external 
regulators cannot tell whether a permissive rule contemplates 
a universal grant of discretion, how can those regulators decide 
whether to defer? In the short run, the only response is that 
they must do their best to ascertain the normative judgments 
underlying the rule based on its context, drafting history, and 
likely effects. In the long run, however, recognizing the exis-
tence of alternative justifications for permissive rules has spe-
cific implications for how external regulators should proceed. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS, LEGISLATURES, AND OTHER 
LAWMAKERS CONSIDERING PARALLEL OR SUPPLEMENTAL 
REGULATION 
When rules of professional conduct give lawyers discretion 
to decide how to act, the argument that other lawmakers 
should not encroach on that discretion initially seems powerful. 
Cynical observers of the professional code-drafting process 
might argue that ethics codes are self-serving and that law-
makers should chart their own course; in other words, that the 
 
the mandatory aspects of the conflict rules suggest that a prudent lawyer 
should have avoided the representation. See generally Green, supra note 11 
(discussing judicial disqualification of counsel in civil cases); Bruce A. Green, 
“Through a Glass, Darkly”: How the Court Views Motions to Disqualify Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201 (1989) (discussing judicial dis-
qualification of counsel in criminal cases). 
 182. Arguably, for example, Model Rule 1.7 gives primacy to the lawyer’s 
business, reputational, and philosophical preferences. Alternatively, it reflects 
the difficulty of distinguishing between cases where a lawyer should be al-
lowed to accept or required to continue a representation because clients who 
understand the risks will benefit from the particular lawyer’s services and 
cases where a lawyer’s refusal of the waiver clearly would be in a client’s best 
interest. 
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rules are generally biased in favor of lawyer interests over cli-
ent and third-party interests, and in favor of client interests 
over public interests. With respect to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
for example, the ABA amendments to Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13 
arguably were a calculated effort to forestall external regula-
tion183 and, as such, deserved no deference from the external 
regulators. As a general matter, however, external lawmakers 
have not adopted the cynical view. They have tended to value 
the codes for several good reasons, including respect for the le-
gal profession’s tradition of self-regulation, respect for state su-
preme courts that (in most jurisdictions) oversee and adopt the 
rules, and a preference for avoiding inconsistent regulation. Ex-
ternal lawmakers may defer to permissive rules, in particular, 
on the assumption that the rules reflect a reasoned normative 
judgment that, for the given categories of conduct, it is wiser 
not to draw categorical lines. 
Nevertheless, as we have shown, there are reasons why 
even a lawmaker who starts from a deferential position should 
not hesitate to probe the precedential value of grants of discre-
tion in the codes. The drafters of permissive rules themselves 
may not have meant to afford lawyers unfettered discretion. 
The drafters may have understood the rules to contain intrinsic 
limitations (such as a requirement that discretion be exercised 
in light of particular considerations) or as being subject to limi-
tations derived from other rules or extra-code constraints. Un-
der these circumstances, external lawmakers should feel free to 
impose restrictions consistent with the limits implicitly incor-
porated into, or anticipated by, the rules. 
Moreover, even a permissive rule that was meant to insu-
late lawyers from professional discipline does not necessarily 
intend to foreclose other lawmakers from reaching supplemen-
tal judgments restricting lawyers’ discretion. Some rationales 
for permissive rules have implications for other areas of law, 
but many do not. 
Consider the relationship between the permissive future 
harm exceptions to confidentiality and the proposed SEC regu-
lations governing disclosures by corporate attorneys.184 Some 
 
 183. See Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Con-
ceptual Fault Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LE-
GAL ETHICS 1089, 1111–12 (2006) (describing ABA decisions designed to “side-
track” aspects of the federal legislation). 
 184. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006) (provid-
ing examples of permissive future harm exceptions), with Letter from ABA to 
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have argued that the SEC should not adopt a rule requiring 
corporate lawyers to report client wrongdoing to the SEC, but 
instead should defer to the permissive ethics rules that are in 
effect in most states.185 It is far from clear, however, that the 
ethics rules provide as much discretion as this argument as-
sumes. Model Rule 4.1 and its state equivalents arguably re-
quire lawyers to disclose wrongdoing in many situations poten-
tially covered by the SEC regulations.186 The confidentiality 
exceptions also may require lawyers to exercise discretion in a 
principled manner that, in at least some cases, points the way 
to disclosure. If the SEC is capable of defining when the rules 
themselves mandate or anticipate disclosure, the SEC can rea-
sonably adopt regulations putting those definitions into effect 
without contradicting the ethics codes. Doing so would clarify 
the uncertainty inherent in the future harm provisions them-
selves, thereby giving greater guidance to lawyers who might 
mistakenly believe that the provisions allow unlimited discre-
tion and who, adhering to the ABA’s pre-Enron philosophy, are 
disinclined ever to exercise their discretion in favor of report-
ing. 
So what should the SEC do, given the competing argu-
ments? In the absence of better information from the code 
drafters, the SEC has little choice but to try to divine the justi-
fications for the confidentiality exceptions from extrinsic evi-
dence and then to determine whether those purposes merit re-
spect. Suppose the SEC initially accepts that the permissive 
future harm provisions were intended to grant relatively un-
bridled discretion. Whether the rationale for that intent is 
normative remains uncertain. The permissive provision may 
simply reflect a political compromise within the ABA between 
those, previously in the majority, who wanted a stronger confi-
dentiality rule, and those who preferred mandatory reporting of 
certain client misconduct. If that is the reality, the SEC can 
reasonably resolve the dispute. 
 
SEC, supra note 25 (describing the proposed SEC regulations). 
 185. See, e.g., Letter from Litig. Section of the State Bar of Cal. to Jona-
than G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/s74502/lssbc040403.htm (urging the SEC to defer to permissive 
state rules); see also Bost, supra note 183, at 1132–35 (discussing California’s 
continuing opposition to the Sarbanes-Oxley rules). 
 186. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2006) (declaring that 
lawyers “shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose a material fact when disclo-
sure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client”). 
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Moreover, even if the SEC agrees with the principles, or 
guidance, provided in the codes, it may reasonably diverge from 
the discretionary rule because, when evaluating how lawyers 
implement the discretion in the SEC’s field of interest, the SEC 
finds that lawyers generally do not exercise discretion in accor-
dance with the spirit of the rule.187 Market forces may be so 
strong that they prevent securities lawyers from ever disclosing 
client misconduct,188 even though the code drafters may some-
times expect disclosure. To the extent the SEC determines that 
the normative aspirations have not been, or cannot be, realized 
as a practical matter, deference to the rule seems inappropri-
ate. 
Insofar as the premises of the permissive confidentiality 
exceptions are normative, it also is not clear that the drafters 
meant to foreclose the imposition of restrictions by external 
lawmakers. The drafters may have concluded that discretion is 
preferable in most cases, but that mandatory reporting would 
be acceptable in a subset of cases, including certain cases in-
volving misconduct by public corporations. Or, in opting for dis-
cretion, the drafters may have overlooked unique considera-
tions relating to the regulation of public companies with which 
the SEC has greater concern and expertise—including the im-
portance of enhancing investor confidence in those companies 
in the post-Enron world. Although the current opponents of 
SEC regulation are able to posit rationales for the permissive 
rules that appear to be relevant to the non-disciplinary con-
texts,189 these may be ex post rationales. 
As a historical matter, one cannot be entirely certain why 
the SEC has scaled back, and in part deferred, its initial pro-
posals. The SEC may have been persuaded by the argument 
that discretion is a preferable regulatory approach in general, 
not just for disciplinary purposes. But this Article’s analysis 
suggests that the SEC should have weighed those arguments 
 
 187. See Peter J. Henning, Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 and Corporate Coun-
sel: Who Better to Prevent Corporate Crime?, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 323, 382 
(2004) (“[T]he real benefit of mandatory complete withdrawal is the leverage it 
gives to attorneys who will not look for loopholes but will adhere to the 
rules.”). 
 188. See Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules 
Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 455, 466–74 (2006) (discussing the incentives of corpo-
rate lawyers). 
 189. Cf. Letter from ABA to SEC, supra note 25 (arguing that certain pro-
posed SEC requirements would undermine corporations’ trust in their law-
yers). 
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on the merits and should not have relied exclusively on the fact 
that the bar itself adopted the permissive approach. If, hypo-
thetically, the SEC found the bar’s premises unpersuasive, the 
SEC should not have hesitated, purely out of deference to the 
codes, to cut back on the discretion afforded by confidentiality 
rules. 
It is important to recognize that some forms of lawmak-
ing—such as code drafting and the promulgation of statutes 
and administrative rules—are legislative in nature, while oth-
ers—such as judicial development of liability standards—are 
not. When legislative forms are in play, as in the case of the 
SEC disclosure proposals, negotiation between the code draft-
ers and other lawmakers is possible.190 This negotiation may be 
explicit191 or implicit, through parallel action.192 Indeed, such 
negotiation is precisely the process that appears to have devel-
oped between the ABA and the SEC regarding their various po-
sitions on disclosures by corporate attorneys.193 This Article’s 
analysis suggests that the extent of discretion anticipated by 
permissive rules is a subject particularly warranting direct at-
tention in such negotiations, lest the expectations of either 
regulatory party be unduly discounted or misunderstood. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS FILLING OTHER LAW-MAKING 
ROLES 
Thus far, this Article has focused on external law-making 
institutions (including courts, legislatures, and administrative 
 
 190. See Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal 
Prosecutors, or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 429, 460–61 (1996) (discussing negotiations among the ABA, 
the Department of Justice, and the courts with respect to the development of 
rules against communicating with represented persons and against subpoena-
ing of attorneys). 
 191. For example, representatives of the code-drafting body and the admin-
istrative agency can meet to discuss issues, provide testimony at each others’ 
hearings, submit comments, or provide task force reports. 
 192. The parallel institutions can simply produce parallel legislation on a 
step-by-step basis that responds to the legislation of the other body. 
 193. In other words, the ABA had adopted a rule to which the SEC re-
sponded with proposed regulations that would have produced dramatic 
change. The ABA countered with a negative task force report and the adoption 
of permissive changes to the rules. The SEC then adopted regulations largely 
consistent with, but which went slightly further than, the ABA rules, but 
which deferred action on its more dramatic proposals. No word has been heard 
on the deferred proposals since. For a further description of this history, see 
Zacharias, supra note 188, at 457–58. 
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agencies) when they are considering promulgating law that 
supplements or potentially preempts the ethics codes. Courts, 
however, fulfill at least two other relevant law-making func-
tions that merit attention. State supreme courts review and are 
responsible for adopting or rejecting code drafters’ proposals,194 
including proposals for permissive rules. Trial courts exercise 
supervisory authority over lawyers appearing in court, some-
times defining the lawyers’ so-called duties as “officers of the 
court.”195 In doing so, trial courts often interpret or build upon 
the meaning of the professional rules. 
This Article’s analysis suggests that state supreme courts 
should pay particular attention to proposals for permissive 
rules. As this Article has shown, permissive rules can easily be 
misinterpreted as giving lawyers more-than-intended discre-
tion and thus are unusually likely to be self-serving. The su-
preme courts therefore should take care not to rubber-stamp 
them. 
A good example is California’s recently-adopted future 
crime exception to attorney-client confidentiality. California 
lawyers used to be governed by a near absolute confidentiality 
provision,196 but were forced to promulgate an exception by leg-
islation mandating a change.197 The code drafters selected a 
permissive exception similar to the original version of Model 
Rule 1.6(b)(1).198 They made two pertinent changes to the 
model rule, however. They added a provision stating that a 
lawyer “who does not reveal information permitted [under the 
 
 194. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 96, at 1308 (“Most state supreme 
courts claim plenary law-making and rule-making authority to regulate the 
conduct of lawyers whom they have authorized to practice law.”). 
 195. Zacharias & Green, supra note 39, at 50, 63. 
 196. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 2003); Fred C. Zacharias, 
Privilege and Confidentiality in California, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 367, 372–73 
(1995) (discussing the near absolute character of confidentiality in California). 
 197. Assemb. 1101, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04vill/asm/ab_1101-1150/ab1101_bill_ 
20031011_chaptered.pdf (calling for a task force “to study and make recom-
mendations for a rule of professional conduct regarding professional responsi-
bility issues related to this act”). 
 198. Compare CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 (2004) (providing 
that a lawyer “may, but is not required to,” reveal information necessary to 
“prevent a criminal act that the member reasonably believes is likely to result 
in death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual”), with MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (providing that a lawyer “may” reveal 
information necessary “to prevent the client from committing a criminal act 
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial 
bodily harm”). 
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exception] does not violate this rule.”199 They also added a 
comment stating that a lawyer is “not subject to discipline for 
revealing confidential information as permitted under this 
Rule.”200 Together, these changes provided lawyers with abso-
lute immunity from discipline for any choice of conduct, how-
ever self-serving.201 In preserving the interests of lawyers, the 
drafters may have undermined the legislative intent to produce 
at least some disclosures that further the public interest. 
Unlike the state supreme courts, which can actually reject 
or rewrite proposed rules, trial courts have only implementa-
tion power. They supervise the conduct of litigators on a day-to-
day basis. This role requires them to oversee conflicts of inter-
est, disputes between lawyers and clients (e.g., about fees and 
advice lawyers have, or have not, given clients), disclosures 
that lawyers might wish to make or refuse to make, and other 
activities that are initially governed by permissive ethics 
rules.202 Issues within these subject matters involving the lim-
its, if any, to lawyer discretion and the obligations of lawyers as 
officers of the court are not often addressed in appellate deci-
sions because the issues tend to be procedural in nature and 
the conduct in question generally occurs outside the courtroom. 
When the permissive rules are unclear, supervisory courts 
serve a useful function in spelling out their meaning.203 It may 
be uniquely important for trial courts to write opinions that 
provide guidance concerning the nature of lawyers’ discretion. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR CODE DRAFTERS 
This Article has highlighted several aspects of code draft-
ing that lawyers and the drafters themselves may not suffi-
ciently have acknowledged. Not all discretionary professional 
rules are the same. Even on their own terms, permissive rules 
authorize varying degrees of discretion. Other lawmakers 
 
 199. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100(E) (2004). 
 200. Id. R. 3-100 discussion. 
 201. The only legal restraints that appear to remain are the potential for 
civil Tarasoff liability for failure to disclose and independent malpractice li-
ability for excessive disclosure. See Zacharias, supra note 196, at 402–03 (dis-
cussing Tarasoff liability). Lawyers will undoubtedly argue that the permis-
sive professional rule was intended to immunize them from such liability, 
leaving courts to assess that argument. 
 202. See, e.g., McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1242 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(interpreting the future crime exception to attorney-client confidentiality). 
 203. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 39, at 39–41 (discussing judicial 
supplementation of ethics rules). 
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sometimes may have reasons to accept the permissive stan-
dards outside the disciplinary context and sometimes should 
feel free to chart their own course. 
These practical realities have significant ramifications for 
code drafters. Lawyers, by training, are most likely to read 
their professional obligations in the same way they read stat-
utes and other legal rules.204 Many will view the codes as a col-
lection of rules proscribing and allowing specific conduct that 
creative lawyers should try to circumvent (within the bounds of 
the law) in their own and their clients’ interests. One of the 
goals of the professional codes is to guide lawyers,205 so it be-
comes especially important for discretionary rules to identify 
how the code drafters expect discretion to be exercised and 
whether that discretion is limited in scope. Thus, for example, 
to the extent that the drafters envision lawyers implementing 
discretionary confidentiality exceptions with a view to the com-
peting client, systemic, and third-party interests rather than 
the lawyers’ own (or exclusively the clients’) interests, the code 
drafters can note that fact and suggest methods by which the 
competing considerations can be balanced.206 
The above discussion also highlights the reality that code 
drafters do not always, or necessarily, adopt permissive rules 
 
 204. Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 
1239, 1249–60 (1991) (discussing the apparent increase in legalization of eth-
ics codes over time). 
 205. See Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Codes, supra note 8, at 257–
65 (discussing the codes’ guidance function). 
 206. See Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, supra note 
125, at 108–09 (discussing guidance that code drafters might provide with re-
spect to discretionary attorney-client confidentiality exceptions). The guidance 
currently provided by the Model Rules is minimal at best. See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (2006) (“In exercising the discretion con-
ferred by this Rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the 
lawyer’s relationship with the client . . . , the lawyer’s own involvement in the 
transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question.”). Other 
ethics codes, such as New York’s Code of Professional Responsibility, provide 
slightly more guidance and in more emphatic terms:  
In exercising this discretion [to report a client’s intended crime], how-
ever, the lawyer should consider such factors as the seriousness of the 
potential injury to others if the prospective crime is committed, the 
likelihood that it will be committed and its imminence, the apparent 
absence of any other feasible way in which the potential injury can be 
prevented, the extent to which the client may have attempted to in-
volve the lawyer in the prospective crime, the circumstances under 
which the lawyer acquired the information of the client’s intent, and 
any other possibly aggravating or extenuating circumstances. 
 N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-7 (2006). 
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hoping to influence or control alternative regulators. The mere 
fact that an ethics rule expresses a normative judgment that 
lawyers should be allowed to exercise discretion for disciplinary 
purposes does not signify that the drafters intended to foreclose 
complementary, supplemental, or even contradictory regula-
tion. 
At times, the drafters may intend to establish discretion as 
a regulatory norm, fully expecting or hoping that courts and 
other law-making institutions will accept their approach.207 
That intent was apparent in 2003 when the ABA added excep-
tions to the confidentiality rule permitting lawyers to disclose 
confidences in limited circumstances to prevent certain client 
harms and wrongdoing.208 The ABA anticipated impending 
administrative regulation that threatened to make disclosure 
mandatory (and, in the ABA’s view, might have undermined 
lawyer-client relationships).209 When, as in this case, the code 
drafters believe that other lawmakers should not encroach on 
lawyers’ discretion, they should say so, rather than preserve 
the fiction that the ethics rules are drafted without regard to 
how other lawmakers will view them.210 Otherwise, faced with 
ambiguity regarding the purposes of permissive rules, external 
regulators will justifiably feel free to ignore them. 
Occasionally, code drafters have deliberately adopted per-
missive rules in the teeth of existing law that deprives lawyers 
of discretion. In pursuing this course, the drafters may simply 
believe strongly in their normative vision and hope to influence 
the other institutions to cede the point or take it into serious 
consideration when adopting supplemental regulation. Alterna-
tively, they may be prepared to live with clashing standards, 
either (1) to make a strong point that they fully expect to lose 
or (2) because the code and alternative standards have force in 
independent spheres, and the drafters are unwilling to employ 
the disciplinary rules to reinforce a legal standard with which 
 
 207. See Koniak, supra note 125, at 1411. 
 208. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2003) (allow-
ing disclosure of confidences to avert financial harms when a client misuses 
the lawyer’s services); id. R. 1.13(c) (allowing lawyers to reveal information 
under limited circumstances when necessary to prevent injury to an organiza-
tional client).  
 209. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 23, at 15–17 (noting that the ABA Task 
Force’s decision to amend the Model Rules after the enactment of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act was partly influenced by Senator Edwards’ proposal that the 
SEC promulgate rules relating to professional conduct). 
 210. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
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they disagree. By adopting a conflicting approach, the drafters 
essentially signal that, with respect to this particular subject 
matter, lawyer-regulators are better able to judge how the 
competing public policies—protecting third-party interests ver-
sus protecting attorney-client relationships, or the importance 
of aggressive advocacy to the system versus judicial economy—
should be resolved. 
This approach is a challenge to external regulators. Again, 
it is one that is better made explicitly. Unless the other law-
makers are told that the bar claims superior judgment in this 
area and are educated about the reason for that superiority, 
they are unlikely to assess the bar’s claim and take it into ac-
count. After all, the codes themselves deny any intent to influ-
ence substantive law.211 An alternative explanation for the 
drafters’ positions usually will exist. 
In short, once code drafters acknowledge that some justifi-
cations for discretionary rules do not support immunity stan-
dards for lawyers in other contexts and that external regulators 
have a role to play in setting alternative or supplemental stan-
dards, it becomes important that code drafters identify their 
expectations for particular permissive rules. One might antici-
pate that bar association drafters, who are aligned with mem-
bers of the profession, will try to protect the membership by 
positing that all, or most, permissive rules justify immunity 
standards. But that is where the participation of the supervis-
ing state supreme courts becomes important. Although the 
courts often rubber-stamp bar proposals,212 they have a particu-
lar interest in the demarcation of lawyer discretion. If the bar 
fails to present permissive rules honestly, the courts are likely 
to intervene.213 
 
 211. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 20 (2006); MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1980). 
 212. See Zacharias, supra note 101, at 375 n.180 (“Courts or the legislature 
ordinarily rubber-stamp professional codes that have been drafted behind 
closed doors by a select group of the profession itself.”). 
 213. Increased participation by the courts at the rule-making stage proba-
bly would be a valuable development in any event. See Ted Schneyer, Legal 
Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 
41 (1996) (“The view that legislatures and executive-branch agencies are bet-
ter occupational rulemakers than either the judiciary or a peak professional 
association, however sound as a generalization, is not necessarily sound when 
it comes to setting standards for law practice. The judiciary’s expertise, its in-
terest in the integrity of the legal process, and its legitimate need for inde-
pendence from the ‘political’ branches must be considered.”); cf. Benjamin H. 
Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control 
GREEN_ZACHARIAS_5FMT 12/22/2006 10:56:08 AM 
2006]  PERMISSIVE ETHICS RULES 325 
 
  CONCLUSION   
On the surface, the permissive ethics rules seem simple: 
they give lawyers a choice. This Article has demonstrated that 
this appearance is deceptive. From the face of most permissive 
rules, it is not clear how much of a choice the rules mean to ac-
cord lawyers or what the effect of that choice should be—on po-
tential discipline and, more importantly, on the judgment of 
other lawmakers considering the same conduct. 
This analysis has important implications for lawyers, code 
drafters, and the alternative regulators. The beguiling simplic-
ity of the codes’ permissive provisions creates a significant risk 
both that lawyers will overemphasize their discretion and that 
the various regulators will misunderstand the import of the 
rules. In the short run, this risk calls for greater care on the 
part of regulators implementing or responding to the rules. In 
the long run, the permissive rules must become more transpar-
ent—an eventuality that calls for greater clarity by the drafters 
and increased scrutiny by supervisory courts. This Article’s dis-
tillation of the complexities of the permissive rules provides a 
foundation upon which the subsequent analysis should build. 
 
Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 
1188 (2003) (“[A]lthough there may be excellent reasons to favor courts as ad-
judicators, when regulating lawyers state supreme courts act as legislators, 
they are not as independent or free from self-interest in that role.”); Wilkins, 
supra note 5, at 887 (discussing the attributes of various policymakers in the 
enforcement of professional standards). 
